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RÉSUMÉ 
Une fraude répandue à l'assurance automobile consiste à soumettre de fausses 
réclamations ou à exagérer les pertes reliées à un sinistre. La performance gran-
dissante des systèmes informatiques et des capacités de stockage crée cependant 
de nouvelles possibilités pour contrer ce fléau. En effet, les méthodes de forage 
de données permettent maintenant à une compagnie d'assurance d'analyser une 
quantité impressionnante d'information afin de déceler les réclamations fraudu-
leuses. Ce mémoire introduit plusieurs méthodes afin de les identifier. Parmi elles, 
on note l'analyse en composantes principales et l'analyse de classification. Ce 
mémoire présente aussi les grandes lignes d'une nouvelle méthode statistique de 
détection des fraudes, appelée PRIDIT. Les résultats obtenus suite à l'application 
des méthodes à un véritable jeu de données sont aussi présentés. 
Mots clés: fraude, assurance automobile, forage de données, classification, . 
composantes principales. 
IV 
SUMMARY 
A common car insurance fraud is to submit false daims or to pad up the severity 
of an accident. The growing performance of both the information processing 
systems and the storage capacities however creates new possibilities to deal with 
this issue. Indeed, the methods of data mining now allow an insurance company 
to analyze an impressive quantity of information in order to detect fraudulent 
daims. This thesis introduces several methods to identify potential fraudulent 
activity. Principal component analysis and dus ter analysis are two methods that 
are discussed. This thesis also introduces an innovative statistical method to 
detect fraud. It is called the PRIDIT method. The results obtained following the 
application of those methods to a real data set are also presented. 
Keywords: fraud, car insurance, data mining, duster analysis, principal com-
ponents. 
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trielle du Conseil de recherches en sciences naturelles et en génie du Canada. 
Par conséquent, ce mémoire se devait d'avoir une forte composante appliqu~e 
afin de respecter l'esprit du programme. Avant sa lecture, deux précisions sont 
cependant nécessaires. D'une part, le lecteur remarquera que l'ouvrage est rédigé 
en anglais et non pas en français comme l'exige généralement l'Université de 
Montréal. Nos interactions avec TD Meloche Monnex exigeaient l'utilisation de 
la langue anglaise. D'autre part, les données fournies par TD Meloche Mon-
nex avaient au moment de la rédaction un caractère commercial important. Ce 
mémoire a donc été confidentiel pour un certain nombre d'années avant sa pub-
lication officielle. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Master's thesis is different from most theses since it has a very strong applied 
nature. Of course, it introduces sorne theoretical notions from statistics and 
computer science. We however do not introduce them for their own sake but as 
a way to handle a precise practical application. The main challenge is therefore 
to combine business and statistical requirements to pro duce an academic work. 
More precisely, we want to identify fraudulent claims within a large data set 
of car insurance claims. Vve however do not have any information on previous 
fraudulent claims. 
This thesis has the following structure. The first chapter introduces the reader 
to main issues about insurance fraud. It also describes the most common car in-
surance coverages and endorsements. The chapter ends with an overview of the 
framework of this project, namely, data mining. Statistical notions are first cov-
ered in the second chapter. vVe introduce a useful cross-classification of the types 
of variables. The second chapter also dise us ses sorne useful data transformations 
that are going to be used in the following analyses. Among them, the RIDIT 
transformation is of particular interest. We then discuss principal component 
analysis to reduce the size of our data set. The chapter ends with an introduction 
to an innovative method to detect fraudulent claims called the PRIDIT algorithm. 
Unlike the two previous chapters, the third chapter covers a singlewide topic, that 
is, cluster analysis. This chapter is actually the main one of this thesis. Both hi-
erarchical and nonhierarchical clustering techniques are introduced. Finally, the 
last chapter presents the results obtained by performing the previous methods. 
We also give sorne recommendations to improve the quality of further analyses 
and results. 
Chapter 1 
INSURANCE FRAUD IN A DATA MINING 
FRAMEWORK 
This first chapter introduces the reader to the insurance fraud framework of the 
project. It do es not indu de any statistical contents. Nevertheless, the reader 
shall read this chapter to understand the followingchapters. This chapter be-
gins with a discussion of insurance fraud. Prevalence of insurance fraud, major 
areas. of potential fraud, and anti-fraud activities are among the covered topics. 
The chapter then introduces the province of Ontario laws and regulations about 
automobile insurance while this project deals with a data set of daims from pol-
icyholders living in this province. The chapter next discusses the selection of 
statistical methods for identification of potential daims. This initial chapter fi-
nally ends with an introduction to the main data mining concepts and techniques 
by explaining what is data mining and reasons why this is relevant to the current 
project. 
1.1. SPONSORING COMPANY 
TD Meloche Monnex Group (TDMMG) is a Canadian company that offers 
personal home and automobile insurance products in Canada. TDMMG also pro-
vides, to a lesser extent, travel and small business coverage. TDGMM exploits 
two brands, namely, TD Meloche Monnex and TD Insurance. TDMMG insures 
3 
professionals, alumni, and affinity group members while TD Insurance insures in-
dividuals as tradition al insurers do. The reader should note that a confidentiality 
issue prevents disclosure in this Master's thesis of sorne information. 
1.2. INSURANCE FRAUD 
Fraud is an important topic in most businesses. At any moment, sorne peo-
ple try to exploit the failures of the system. Telecommunication fraud, credit 
card fraud, money laundering are aIl common problems in their respective fields. 
However, insurance fraud is different on one important aspect from other types of 
fraud. An insurance fraud in not discovered unless an investigation team found 
that a fraud occurred. A financial institution, for instance; usually knows credit 
card fraud, quite rapidly. This difference makes difficult the development of a 
statistical model for insurance fraud since claims do not have fraudulent or non-
fraudulent labels, unlike credit card transactions. The current project is about 
insurance fraud, which is quite a vast field of study. Two major areas of potential 
insurance fraud are home and automobile insurance. Home insurance provides 
coverage against perils that may occur to the residence. Automobile insurance 
provides protection against loss to covered vehicles. Sorne possible perils are colli-
sion, theft of v~hicle, and corporal damages due to an accident. The chapter later 
describes automobile insurance in details. This section introduces one common 
definition of fraud. This section is based on Viaene and Dedene (2004). 
The legal system defines a fraud as a combination of three components, that 
is, it involves material misrepresentations, there is intent to deceive, and the 
main objective is to gain an unjust advantage. Those three components are now 
discussed. 
(1) A fraudulent behavior involves material misrepresentations. First, fraud-
sters may use concealment, which is the intentional dissimulation of im-
portant facts. He can also use falsification, which is the modification of 
information for his own profit. Finally, a material misrepresentation may 
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simply consist of a lie. For example, a policyholder who says during un-
derw~iting that his 16-year-old child never drives his car knowing that it 
is wrong is a kind of material misrepresentation. 
(2) A fraudulent behavior involves intent to deceive. This premeditation con-
tribut es to make of an abuse of insurance a criminal activity. This Mas-
ter's thesis do es not however.suppose fraud to be a criminal behavior. The 
next section on functional classifications of insurance fraud discusses this 
distinction. 
(3) A fraudulent behavior involves anaim of gaining an unauthorized benefit. 
For instance, a policyholder who says he lost five hundred compact discs 
during a robbery knowing that he had lost only one hundred of them 
is actually an unauthorized benefit. The possible unauthorized benefits 
are infinite and range from a few dollars to many millions dollars undue 
profits. 
The previous definition of fraud is used in most legal systems in the world. 
Although it is widely used, the insurance industry usually employs the word fraud 
to designate an abuse of insurance performed by a policyholder. The insurance 
literature makes a distinction between soft and hard fraud. This chapter later 
covers more precisely this distinction. 
This section defined the concept of fraud. The next section justifies resources 
devoted to controlling in surance fraud with a particular emphasis on automobile 
insurance fraud. 
1.3. PREVALENCE OF INSURANCE FRAUD 
Two major organizations concerned with insurance fraud in the United States 
are the Coalition Against lnsurance Fraud (CAlF) and the National lnsurance 
Crime Bureau (NICB). Those two organizations provide their own estimates of 
the prevalence of insurance fraud. The CAlF estimates at $80 billion each year 
the amount of insurance fraud in the United States. The NICB provides a quite 
different estimation of $20 billion each year in the United States. Although es-
timates are very different, they show that fraud is an important problem in the 
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insurance industry. The Insurance Bureau of Canada (IBC) is the Canadian coun-
terpart of the previous two organizations. The information on the prevalence of 
insurance fraud in Canada is however not accessible. The prevalence of insur-
ance fraud varies not only among regions but also varies among lin es of business 
(Viaene and Dedene, 2004). 
The extent of fraud is also related to the image of the insurance industry. A 
survey conducted on a random sample of 1000 V.S. adults concluded that 25% of 
them consider acceptable to overstate the value of an insurance claim -(Coalition 
Against Insurance Fraud, 2003). Moreover, this same survey concluded that 10% 
of V.S. adults found acceptable to submit a claim for items not lost or damaged 
or for treatments not provided. This study also concludes that the extent of fraud 
depends on the economic climate and the context in which the fraud happens. 
Thus, during an economic recession, fraud costs are more important. On that 
issue, this survey finds that 66% of V.S. adults say they are more willing to 
commit an insurance fraud in an economic downturn than in an otherwise good 
economic vitality. Literature also shows that when a claim is part of a major 
catastrophe, fraud is more likely to happen (Viaene and Dedene, 2004). 
The main point is that different studies lead to very different estimates of the 
prevalence of fraud. The main reason is the absence of consensus on a precise 
definition of fraud. This makes the evaluation of this concept quite difficult, 
say, impossible. Previous estimates may therefore be largely underestimated or 
overestimated. Although estimates of the prevalence of fraud are questionable, 
insurance industry admits the importance of such a phenomenon. In addition, 
although large losses are incurred by insurers, they are usually reluctant to spend 
money and time for dealing with this problem. This chapter later discusses this 
issue. 
This section showed that insurance fraud is not a marginal phenomenon. The 
quantification of insurance fraud is however largely different between studies. The 
next section introduces the concept of insurance fraud by describing common 
functional classifications found in the literature. 
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1.4. FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS OF INSURANCE FRAUD 
Insurance fraud is a general expression by itself. In fact, there are many 
types of insurance fraud making inappropriate the creation of a single category 
including aIl of them. This section presents common classifications of in surance 
fraud. Such a discussion is useful to better understand the scope of the project 
and to get a clear and precise situation of the problem. This section introduces 
the three classifications defined by Viaene and Dedene (2004). 
First, there is a distinction between an internaI and an external fraud. Those 
two terrns represent whether insiders or outsiders of the insurance industry com-
mit a fraud. Insiders include insurers, agents, brokers, managers, insurer employ-
ees or representatives. Outsiders include applicants, policyholders, and claimants. 
There is also a possibility, that outsiders collaborate with insiders to commit a 
fraudulent activity. Although TDMMG has an interest in both internaI and ex-
ternal fraud, this project focuses on the latter. 
The second classification differentiates between an underwriting and a claim 
fraud. An underwriting fraud is committed at the underwriting stage of the insur-
ance process. A policyholder who gives false information to the insurer about the 
uses of a covered vehicle to obtain a reduced premium commits an underwriting 
fraud. More precisely, a policyholder may say he drives ten kilometers to reach 
his working place while he actually drives fifty kilometers. The second type of 
fraud refers to claim occurring after a peril happens. For example, a policyholder 
may exaggerate the severity of a loss to gain undue advantage. The term fraud 
used alone usually indicates the latter type of fraud. 
The third classification differentiates between a hard and a soft fraud. This 
classification refers to the difference between the law connotation of fraud and a 
broad notion of fraud. Derrig and Krauss (1994) gives the following definition of 
an insurance claim hard fraud. 
Definition 1.1. An hard fraud is reserved for criminal acts, provable beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that violate statutes making the willful act of obtaining money 
or value from an insurer un der false pretenses or material misrepresentations. 
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According to Derrig (2002), possible hard insurance fraud in personal auto-
mobile insurance are: 
• staged accident, 
• claimant not involved in accident, 
• duplicate claims for same injury, 
• bills submitted for treatment not given, 
• injury not related to accident, 
• fictitious injury, 
• misrepresentation of wage loss. 
Those fraudulent activities are criminal offenses and are therefore quite rare. 
Abuses of insurance are, by far, more common. Those abuses are what the in-
surance industry calls soft fraud, which is the exaggeration of a legitimate claim. 
A hard fraud is usually a planned activity while a soft fraud is an opportunistic 
activity. The words planned and opportunistic are often used instead of hard and 
soft fraud. For the purpose of this Master's thesis, the term fraud will be used 
to designate an abuse of insurance (soft fraud) and not the legal meaning (hard 
fraud). 
The previous three classifications help to refine the scope of the project. 
Therefore, it can be reformulated as the study of external insurance fraud occur-
ring at the claiming step of the insurance process such that behaviors of interest 
range from the exaggeration to organized fraud namely, soft fraudulent behaviors. 
1.5. REASONS FOR COMMITTING FRAUDULENT BEHAVIOR 
Fraudulent behaviors are not committed for their own sake but for sorne rea-
sons which may be quite numerous. However, sorne reasons are surely more 
corr'nnon than others. This section introduces reasons why a policyholder might 
want to commit a fraudulent behavior. 
The analysis of behaviors is the nature of behavioral sciences like psychology. 
It would therefore be inappropriate to pretend being able to analyze such a broad 
and difficult issue in a single section. Nevertheless, Viaene and Dedene (2004) 
provide a simple but useful framework to fraudulent behaviors that will be used in 
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this project. They consider such behaviors as a product of two elements: motiva-
tion and opportunity. While those two concepts may seem obvious, they are very 
far from being simple to understand and explain. This Master's thesis assumes 
the intuitive definition of those terms. A precise study of fraud motivations from 
a behavioral perspective is presented by Duffield and Grabosky (2001). 
The motivation of a policyholder to commit a fraudulent behavior may take 
several forms. According to Viaene and Dedene (2004), an economic motivation 
is present in most cases of insurance fraud, that is, fraudsters want to make undue 
profits. However, many other motivations might explain a fraudulent behavior as 
illustrated by the vast quantity of papers on the subject of motivation to defraud 
an insurance company. As an example, Dionne et al (1993) justify insurance 
fraud by causes like changes in morality, increased poverty, modifications in the 
behavior of. the intermediaries (medical doctors or mechanics for instance) and 
attitudes of insurers. Empirical evidence shows that changes in morality are quite 
important in explaining fraud. 
A fraudulent behavior against the interests of an insurer is committed when 
there is a difference in the possession of information in favor of the policyholder. 
This principle is called information asymmetry in the literature. A daim fraud 
would certainly not be committed if the insurer knows everything about the 
underlyingperil. However, if the policyholder has important information on the 
peril and the insurer do es not have it, a fraudulent behavior is more likely to occur. 
For example, there is an information asymmetry when a daimant exaggerates the 
severity of an injury because he hides sorne information to the insurer. 
1.6. PROBLEMS FACING AN INSURANCE COMPANY 
Up to this point, this chapter considered insurance fraud from the policyholder 
perspective. The main objective of the project is however to findways TDMMG 
may deal with insurance fraud. This section, based on Viaene and Dedene (2004), 
identifies six problems an insurer may encounter wh en dealing with fraud. 
(1) A major problem with insurance fraud is that it is not self-revealing. In 
fact, there is no way to know if a daim is actually fraudulent unless it is 
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discovered. Other types of fraud like the doning of a credit card are more 
than likely to be known by the financial institution since the victim shaU 
eventuaUy be aware of such a situation and will communicate with the 
institution. An insurance company has to consider a daim non-fraudulent 
unless a special investigation has proved otherwise. Furthermore, everyone 
would agree that it is easier to control something known and noticed over 
something unknown and unnoticed .. 
(2) An insurer may also have difficulties to prove that a daim is legaUy fraud-
ulent. Moreover, a le gal action requires many financial and human re-
sources, that is, money invested in suing potential fraudsters is usually 
more important than its potential benefits. 
(3) An insurer must also consider the dynamic nature of fraud, that is, fraud 
evolves with time and economy. Current fraudulent behaviors are quite 
different from those performed 30 years ago when, for instance, Internet 
was inexistent. Thus, fraud control is a continuo us process. This means 
that an insurer must be aware of economic evolution to update frequently 
its process. 
(4) An insurer faces the problem of the selection of an efficient method. This 
is a problem because there are a large number of methods and the choice of 
a method depends on many factors such as available data and computing 
resources. Many efforts have to be devoted to the selection of the method. 
(5) The expression used by Viaene and Dedene (2004) best describes and 
explains the fifth problem: News on fraud is always bad news. In most if 
not aU businesses, management is interested in concepts like investments, 
budgeting, and profits, not in a pessimistic concept like fraud. Work 
compensation of high-Ievel managers is dosely related to financial results 
outperforming a given threshold. No compensation is associated with 
the reduction of fraud by a given amount, that is, this is not a factor in 
assessing the performance of managers. 
10 
(6) A sixth problem facing insurers addresses the quantification of the fraud. 
As explained earlier, the task of defining the fraud concept makes it dif-
ficult to measure its extent. It also makes difficult the assessment of 
financial impacts of fraud control measures because the validity of this 
measurement is more or less interesting. 
This section introduced 'the main problems facing an insurer on the issue of 
fraud control. Fortunately, the literature contains efforts to fight this threat. The 
next section summarizes actual developments on this subject. 
1.7. FIGHTING FRAUO 
This section provides a summary of common activities that cou Id improve the 
fight against fraud by insurers as highlighted by VÎaene and Dedene (2004). Anti-
fraud activities are performed at both the community and the insurer-Ievel. At 
the community-Ievel, one main activity consists in the foundation offraud bureaus 
and creation of anti-fraud alliances. At the insurer-Ievel, fraud control consists in 
two approaches, that is, prevention and detection. This section introduces those 
activities. 
Community-Ievel anti-fraud activities are actions undertaken by the insurance 
industry to fight fraud. One activity is to found fraud bureaus and create alliances 
among insurance stakeholders. This includes governments, insurance companies, 
and sorne customers associations. For instance, the Coalition Against Insurance 
Fraud and the Insurance Bureau of Canada are two important associations of 
insurers aimed at fighting insurance fraud in Canada. This project do es however 
exclu de this type of activities. The reader interested in this large topic is referred 
to the discussion papers of the National Insurance Fraud Forum held in 2000. 
Fraud control at the firm-Ievel is possible using two approaches, namely, fraud 
. prevention and fraud detection. They are complementary approaches because 
each has its specific goals. This section introduces both approaches but puts 
emphasis on fraud detection. 
First, fraud prevention refers to actions made by the insurance industry before 
the fraud is made. Viaene and Dedene (2004) consider prevention as the best 
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way to fight fraud. Insurers devote large amount of money to prevent fraud. 
Advertisements of potential drawbacks of insurance fraud are an example of fraud 
prevention. 
Fraud detection identifies activities undertaken by an insurance company to 
identify policyholders committing fraud. According to Viaene and Dedene (2004), 
fraud detection is a three-step process. Identification of potentially fraudulent 
daims is the first step. ActualIy, TDMMG relies on a Special Investigation Unit 
(hereafter named SIU) to identify fraudulent daims. The SIU itself relies on pre-
cise fraud indicators to achieve this step. Automobile fraud insurance indicators 
indude aggressive daimant, absence of witnesses at the time of loss, and a large 
number of days between two events, usually the loss and the daim. The second 
step consists of an investigation of identified daims. The SIU may perform ev-
erything for a small phone calI to a complete investigation by a daim adjuster. 
The third step is about decisions taken by the insurer on fraudulent daims. On 
one hand, the insurer may act unilaterally according to any of the following ac-
tivities. At this step of the fraud detection, the insurer can do nothing against 
the fraudulent policyholder. The insurer may also decide to dis miss compensa-
tion to the policyholder. To a lesser extent, insurer may simply reduce allowed 
compensation. Finally, the insurer may press charges against the policyholder. 
On the other hand, the insurer may negotiate with the fraudulent policyholder. 
This way, insurer may want the daimant to drop his daim. The daimant may 
also decide to reduce his daim. 
The current project is about increasing the efficiency of the identification step 
of the detection fraud process. The actual SIU performs essentially manual work 
in identifying potential fraud. Despite the good work performed by the SIU, 
manu al work is influenced by things such as the analyst's mood and workload. 
Furthermore, it takes a lot of time and many resources. The implementation of 
an automatic proces's would be preferable. More precisely, an algorithm able to 
identify a potential fraudulent daim as it is received by the daims department 
allows a rapid dispatch of those threats to the SIU. 
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Community and insurerlevel activities are complementary. An insurer should 
devote resources at both levels to fight fraudulent behaviors. The literature how-
ever considers insurer-Ievel activities as more efficient in fighting fraud (Vi,aene 
and Dedene, 2004). Proximity of fraud explains this recommendation. This is 
the objective of the current project. 
By now, this chapter has introduced main aspects on insurance fraud espe-
cially related to the automobile fraud insurance. The next section gives a: precise 
description of the automobile insurance system in Ontario. 
1.8. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE SYSTEM IN ONTARIO 
This project considers personal automobile insurance fraud and policyholders 
whose principal residence is located in Ontario. In fact, great differences in leg-
islation between provinces require us to study only one province. However, our 
statistical methods would certainly be applicable to other provinces after sorne 
adjustments. Two reasons explain the choice of Ontarian policyholders as the 
framework for this project. The nature of the automobile regime in Ontario is a 
first reason, where private insurance companies are responsible for both corpo-
ral and material damages. In sorne other provinces, private insurance companies 
are responsible for the latter only. For instance, in Québec, a public organiza-
tion called Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec is responsible for corporal 
damages. It is therefore possible to perform statistical analyses on a data set with 
both types of daims (corporal and material). The large volume of data available 
for Ontario policyholders also explains this choice, that is, a larger volume of data 
means potentially more useful information. 
In Ontario, laws require any driver to purchase four coverages while sorne 
others are optional. This section, provided by courtesy of the Insurance Bu-
reau of Canada (2006), introduces those compulsory coverages and main option al 
coverages. 
13 
1.8.1. Mandatory coverages 
First, every driver must have a Liability coverage of at least $200,000 while 
an higher amount is largely recommended. Liability coverage protects the pol-
icyholder for corporal damages (injury or death) caused by his negligence to 
someone else. It covers the damage amount, costs for processing the daim and 
defense costs. 
Every driver must purchase an Accident Benefits coverage. It covers injuries 
and death that might happen to the policyholder caused by a vehide accident. 
This coverage does not depend on who caused the accident. Minimum coverage 
requirements depend on the type of injury. The reader is referred to the Insurance 
Act of Ontario for a description of aIl requirements. 
By law, each driver must have an Uninsured Motorists coverage. It covers 
costs related to corporal damages incurred by the policyholder (injury or death) 
in case of an accident for which an uninsured mot orist or a hit-and-run driver is 
held responsible. The regulation requires a minimum coverage of $200,000. In 
addition, each driver must have such coverage for damages caused to the poli-
cyholder's automobile. In this case, regulation requires a minimum coverage of 
$25,000. 
Finally, any driver must purchase a Direct Compensation - Property Damage 
coverage. This last mandatory coverage provides benefits in case of damages 
to the policyholder's vehicle due to someone else's faùlt. It covers also vehicle 
contents. There is no precise minimum coverage requirement. 
1.8.2. Optional coverages . 
Whereas the previous four coverages are mandatory, the following coverages 
are optional, but are usuaIly included in an automobile insurance contract. Due to 
their optional nature, they are not subject to any minimum or limit requirements. 
In addition, a policyholder has to choose only one of them. This section introduces 
those four optional coverages. 
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First, insurers commonly offer Collision Coverage. It covers damages to the 
policyholder's vehicle in two situations, namely, when the policyholder is at-fault 
or when his vehicle is damaged by an unidentified object or vehicle. 
A second common coverage, called comprehensive coverage, covers the policy-
holder against damages to his vehicle caused by perils that do not fall un der the 
previous coverage. In other words, it covers the policyholder against fire, theft, 
and vandalism. 
A policyholder might want to select the previous two coverages. If so, the 
all perils coverage is available. It is a package deal including both collision and 
comprehensive coverages. Although this coverage provides benefits to the poli-
cyholder against most perils, sorne are still not inclusIed. The insurance contract 
specifies those exclusions. 
A poli~yholder may want coverage for selected perils. For that reason, insurers 
usually offer a specified perils coverage. 
1.8.3. Cornrnon endorsernents 
An insurance contract usually includes sorne additions (endorsements) to the 
standard policy. Insurers commonly offer the following two endorsements. 
First, a policyholder may add a loss of use endorsement to his insurance 
contract. This endorsement allows the policyholder to rent a vehicle free of charge 
following a covered peril for the time the policyholder's vehicle is out of use. This 
endorsement is subject to a limit amount that depends on the insurance contract. 
Second, insurers usually offer a waiver of depreciation endorsement. In case 
of damages to a vehicle purchased for less than a predetermined amount of time 
when the loss occurs, the policyholder is entitled to a compensation equivalent to 
the value of the vehicle at the time of the purchase. Fraud related to this specific 
endorsement has already been studied by Dionne and Gagné (2002). In their 
article, they show that policyholders having this endorsement in their insurance 
contract have a higher probability of theft near the end of the coverage period. 
Unfortunately, this information is not available in the current project. 
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Insurers offer other endorsements to their policyholders. The websites of in-
surers usually provide plenty of information on their products. 
This section introduced the reader to the automobile insurance reglme III 
Ontario. The next section discusses business and statistical constraints to the 
current project. 
1.9. SELECTION OF A STATISTICAL METHOD 
One challenge of the project is to conciliate both business and statistical 
perspectives. This section discusses the selection of an appropriate statistical 
method in the actual business framework. 
From a business perspective, the selected method must 
• be applicable while requiring minimal resources, 
• be able to predict future incoming daims on their fraud likelihood. 
From a statistical perspective, the selected method must 
• take into account the lack of available information about the outcome . 
variable (fraud), 
• be efficient with a large volume of data. 
There are two statistical approaches to ide'ntify potentially fraudulent auto-
mobile daims. On one hand, there are methods designed in an insurance fraud 
framework. They are common statistical methods with sorne modifications for 
a better use in insurance. They are found in insurance and risk journals. An 
example is the Kohonen's self-organizing feature map as Brockett et al. (1998) 
applied to insurance. Those methods are however not appropriate in aIl situa-
tions. Kohonen's self-organizing feature map is not appropriate because it requires 
many resources mostly computation al. Most economical and statistical models 
are usually not appropriate because they require much information about previ-
ous fraudulent daims. Brockett et al. (2002) propose a method, called principal 
component analysis of RIDITs. This last method seems to respect the four cri-
teria previously exposed. The. second chapter covers this method. On the other 
hand, there are general statistical methods. Among them, the duster analysis 
respects the previous four criteria. The third chapter introduces this statistical 
16 
analysis. Before discussing any statistical analysis, let us introduce the reader'to 
the main framework of the current project, that is, data mining. 
1.10. DATA MINING 
The increasing power of today's comput ers allows businesses to gather a large 
volume of data. Businesses store most of their operational transactions in a 
system. TDMMG manages three such systems called AS-400, the staging, and 
the datawarehouse. Such a large volume of data opens the way to the use of data 
mining techniques. There are many subfields with different objectives inside the 
large data mining field. Among them, the subfield of data clustering encompasses 
both clustering and data mining techniques to explore large data sets. This is 
actually the framework of the project. This section introduces the main concepts 
of data mining. The third chapter covers the cluster analysis issue. 
There are different definitions of data mining in the literature. Sorne authors 
consider data mining as a step toward a general process called Knowledge discov-
ery in databases (KDD) while others do not make that distinction and consider 
both concepts as equivalent (Han and Kamber, 2006). This Master's thesis uses 
the latter interpretation as expressed by the following definition of data mining 
(Berry and Linoff, 2004) [pA]. 
Definition 1.2. Data mining is the exploration and analysis of large quantities 
of data in order to discover meaningful patterns and rules. 
This definition highlights three aspects of data mining. First, data mining is 
a process performed on a large ·amount of data. Moreover, large volume of data 
also means large amount of noisy data. A data cleaning must therefore precede an 
. data mining tasks. Second, it is an exploration tool. In other words, data mining 
is not an end by itself but a way to obtain new information for further analyses. 
A predictive result is usually possible with appropriate subsequent analyses. This 
is completely different from common statistical tools such as hypothesis testing. 
Thirdly, data mining implies the automatic detection of patterns using computa-
tional resources. 
The data mining process consists of seven steps: 
(1) data cleaning, 
(2) data integration (combination of multiple sources), 
(3) data selection, 
(4) data transformation, 
(5) data modeling, 
(6) evaluation of patterns, 
(7) knowledge presentation. 
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The previous process is adapted from Han and Kamber (2006). It is important 
to note the dynamic nature of this process. For instance, data cleaning may be 
performed at different times during the data mining process sin ce typing errors 
may be found later in the process. This project is concerned with aU steps of the 
process. 
Hastie et al. (2001) categorizes data mining techniques as either supervised or 
unsupervised methods. On one hand, supervised methods require the company to 
possess information about the outcome variable for aU claims or at least a sample 
of it. In the current project, the company would have to know if claims are either 
fraudulent or non-fraudulent: Due to unavailability of that out come variable, this 
project do es not cover those types of methods. On the other hand, unsupervised 
methods do not require the company to have that information about the out come 
variable. However, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions from those methods. 
This section introduced the reader to the main data mining concepts. It first 
gave a formaI definition of data mining. The typical data mining pro cess was 
then introduced. FinaUy, the section made a distinction between supervised and 
unsupervised methods. 
1.11. USES OF DATA MINING 
This section introduces six main uses of data mining concepts and techniques: 
classification, estimation, prediction, association, clustering, and profiling . 
• Classification: Classification is one of the most important objectives in 
data mining and in an sciences in general. Classification requires the out-
come variable to be qualitative with categories already determined. For 
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instance, an insurer may want to classify its policyholders as good or bad 
drivers. In that last situation, the categories good or bad are determined 
prior to classification. Classification also requires availability of infor-
mation about the outcome variable. Therefore, a supervised method is 
necessary to achieve classification. 
• Estimation: Whereas the previous task assumed qualitative variables, the 
present task is about quantitative variables. The determination of this 
year's number of claims for a population of policyholders given this infor-
mation for a sample of policyholders is an example of an estimation task. 
There are two reasons why one would like to estimate a value. First, it 
allows observations to be ranked based on its estimated value. For exam-
pIe, classes may be ranked based on the estimation. Second, estimation 
allows the classification of observations into different groups (range of val-
ues) based on its estimated value. For instance, policyholders may be 
classified as having many or no claim. Note the emphasis on obtaining 
actual information and not future information. Like the previous task, a 
supervised method is necessary for estimation purposes. 
• Prediction: Prediction is similar to estimation. The emphasis is however 
on obtaining information relating to a future period .. The determination of 
next year's number of claims for a given policyholder is an example of pre-
diction. As classification and estimation, prediction requires a supervised 
method due to its need of information about an outcome variable. 
• Association: The association task is also called affinity analysis or market 
basket analysis by sorne authors (Larose, 2005). Data mining may allow 
the generation of rules, which is defined as a relation between two or more 
variables. Determining the proportion of male policyholders that have a 
sport car is an example of an association task. In that case, the gender 
of a policyholder and his car's model are associated. The generation of 
rules may also be appropriate, in sorne situations, to predict future obser-
vations. This predictive ability mainly depends on the context. It would 
not make sense to predict the car's model of a policyholder based on its 
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gender. It would however make sense to predict the driving ability based 
on the age of the policyholder. Association rules are often formulated 
as if-then clause. Unlike previous tasks, the creation of rules do es not 
however require information on the out come variable. Association is thus 
performed by an unsupervised method . 
• Clustering: Clustering is defined as the creation of groups (or clusters) in 
minimizing the similarity between groups while maximizing the similarity 
inside those groups. Unlike classification, clustering does not require pre-
determined classes. The analyst obtains groups that are statistically dif-
ferent but not necessarily according to the out come variable. It is therefore 
important that a knowledgeable person observes the results. Clustering is 
usually performed at the beginning of the data mining process. Results 
obtained are then used in subsequent statistical analysis to provide new 
and more precise knowledge of a data set. Clustering is an unsupervised 
method because it do es not require information on the out come variable . 
• Profiling: Profiling is also called description by sorne authors (Larose, 
2005). An insurer may want to know more about data and discover new 
things that may be appropriate for further analysis. Profiling is thus seen 
as giving to the company's executives new interesting issues to consider 
by unveiling otherwise unknown situations. In sorne ways, profiling is 
similar to fishing. The analyst is not sure if something will come out of 
his exploration of the data. Furthermore, if something is observed, it is 
not sure if it would be interesting or useful to the company. However, it 
may reveal important facts that would require further investigation. Both 
supervised and unsupervised methods can perform profiling. 
The available data set suggests to use an unsupervised statistical method be-
cause the data set contains no information on whether or not a claim is fraudulent. 
Thus, three tasks may be performed in this project, namely, affinity grouping, 
clustering, and profiling. However, clustering is chosen for business reasons as the 
main objective of the project in a data mining framework. We will create groups 
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(or clusters) of similar claims in order to highlight the characteristics shared by 
most fraudulent claims. Clustering techniques are covered in Chapter 3. 
Data mining is, an appropriate framework to deal with the current project 
about fraud detection. Other interesting points about data mining include current 
applications of data mining, reasons for the development of that field of study and 
methodologies associated with it. However, it is beyond the scope of this project. 
The interested reader is referred to Berry and Linoff (2004) for an overview of 
data mining applied to business context. Many other references are also available 
for other fields of study. 
This chapter first provided the reader with a knowledge of insurance and fraud 
concepts. Sorne covered topics were the prevalence of insurance fraud and func-
tional classifications of reasons for committing fraudulent behaviors. This chapter 
then discussed the laws and regulations of the automobile insurance system in 
Ontario. It then discussed the selection of an appropriate statistical method for 
the detection of fraud. This chapter ended with an introduction to the main data 
mining concepts and techniques. 
Chapter 2 
STATISTICAL NOTIONS, PRINCIPAL 
COMPONENT ANALYSIS, AND THE PRIDIT 
METHOD 
This chapter begins with a discussion on the statistical aspects necessary to subse-
quent reading. The chapter is broadly divided in three parts. First, it introduces 
the reader to sorne statistical notions. Among other things, it proposes a potential 
classification of variables, discusses data standardization and RIDIT transforma-
tion. This chapter then introduces principal component analysis (PCA). The 
PCA is used here to obtain a smaUer data set given a very large number of vari-
ables. The third part introduces the reader to the principal component analysis 
of RIDITs method (PRIDIT). Broadly, it is a method designed by Brockett et al. 
(2002) to classify incoming claims according to their fraud likelihood. 
2.1. CLASSIFICATION OF VARIABLES 
Statistical analyses generaUy involve a relatively smaU number of variables 
and few different types of variables compared with data mining. From a data 
mining perspective, a data set however contains many variables of different types. 
This would not be a problem if one could use the same statistical method for aU 
variables. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Any data mining task requires a 
thorough understanding of the available variables. Therefore, there is a necessity 
to introduce the reader to the type of variables classification that will be used for 
the remainder of this thesis. This is the topie of this section. 
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There are various schemes to classify variables according to their type. It 
would be great to have a single classification appropriate for aIl data sets. Un-
fortunately, the issue is by far more complex. GeneraIly, in statistic, a single 
classification is sufficient. For example, one may describe aIl variables in terms 
of nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio variables. Due to the large number of 
different types of variables in a data mining task, this classification is not suffi-
cient. Anderberg (1973) proposes a very interesting cross-classification of vari-
ables. This book actually provides one of the best discussions on this issue. It 
classifies a variable according to both its scale of measurement and its range. 
On one hand, one may classifya variable according to the size of its range set. 
In other words, a variable is either a continuous, a discrete, or a binary variable. 
Those categories are assumed mutually exclusive. 
Anderberg (1973) gives the following definition of a continuous variable. 
Definition 2.1. A continuous variable is a variable having an uncountably infi-
nite range set. 
We find the expression uncountably infinite redundant because an uncount-
ably range set is, by definition, infinite. In an insurance framework, a common 
continuous variable is the time interval between two events like an accident and 
a claim. Note that the observed time interval between two events is no more a 
continuous but a discrete variable. In fact, the limited number of decimals of a 
continuous variable makes it a discrete variable. A common mistake is to define 
a discrete variable as a variable that may take only integer values. This is often 
but not always the case. 
Anderberg (1973) also gives this definition of a discrete variable. 
Definition 2.2. A discrete variable is a variable having a finite, or at most 
countably injinite range set. 
An example of a discrete variable is the indemnity given to a policyholder. 
This variable is discrete because an amount of money takes a limited number of 
decimals (two). However, such a variable is often considered as continuous in 
order to use a particular statistical method. 
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Finally, Anderberg (1973) considers a binary variable as a special case of a 
discrete variable. 
Definition 2.3. A binary variable is a discrete variable which may take on only 
two values. 
The driver's gender is an example of a binary variable. A binary variable 
is also called a dichotomous variable. Sorne authors do not make a distinction 
between a dis crete and a binary variable. We however do make this distinction in 
this thesis because we later introduce sorne similarity measures that are specifie 
to binary variables. Note that a binary variable is usually coded as either zero or 
one. 
Sorne authors consider two sub-types of binary variables, that is, a binary 
variable may be symmetric or asymmetric (Han and Kamber, 2006). Symmetric 
means that the two possible values on a variable are given the same importance. 
For example, the driver's gender is a symmetric binary variable because it does not 
matter whether the male or the female value is coded as zero or one. Obviously, 
asymmetric means that two values on a variable are givendifferent importance. 
The more important outcome is now coded as one while the other is coded as 
zero. For instance, assume a variable that indicates if a car accident caused death. 
A car accident with death is less probable but more severe than a car accident 
without death. Therefore, a death value should be coded as one while a no-death 
value should be coded as zero. This distinction is subtle and it is not necessary for 
this project. This distinction is however used by many authors when discussing 
similarity measures such as the Jaccard coefficient in cluster analysis. 
On the other hand, we may classify a variable according to its scale of measure-
ment. A variable is either a nominal, an ordinal, an interval, or a ratio variable. 
Those categories are assumed mutually exclusive. 
Suppose XA and XB are values for objects A and B on variable X. 
Definition 2.4. A nominal variable satisfies one of the following relations: 
(i) XA = XB, 
(ii) XA i= XB· 
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The driver's gender is an example of a nominal variable. The only thing we 
know is whether an observation is different from another on this variable. 
Definition 2.5. An ordinal variable satisfies one of the following relations: 
(i) XA = XE, 
(ii) XA < XE, 
(iii) XA > XE. 
In an insurance framework, an ordinal scale variable may be the risk category 
of a policyholder. For instance, an insured may be classified as a low-risk or a 
high-risk policyholder. VVe know that an observation is identical or different from 
another on this variable but also that a high-risk policyholder is riskier to insure 
than a low-risk policyholder. 
Definition 2.6. An interval variable satisfies one of the three relations of an 
ordinal variable. H owever, X A - XE is now defined. 
In that case, it is possible to say that an observation is greater or lower than 
another observation on that variable while the difference between them is also 
meaningful. The accident year of a claim is an example of an interval variable. 
An accident that occurred in 2006 is more recent than an accident that occurred 
in 2005. Furthermore, we can say that there is a one-year difference between both 
events. 
Definition 2.7. A ratio variable satisfies one of the three relations of an ordinal 
variable. However, XA/XE is now defined. 
A ratio variable may be the annual premium for a policyholder. In that case, 
we know that an observation is greater or lower than another, while their ratio 
has a useful meaning. For instance, we may say that the annual premium of 
policyholder A is twice the annual premium of policyholder B. 
The difference between an interval and a ratio scale in this thesis has mainly 
an educative purpose. In fact, no clustering techniques benefit from additional 
information given by a ratio scale over an interval scale variable (Anderberg, 
1973). 
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TAB. 2.1. Cross-classification of variables in our data set. 
Il Continuous 1 Discrete 1 Binary 1 
Ratio NIA Available NIA 
Interval Rare Available NIA 
Ordinal Rare NIA NIA 
Nominal Aberrant Available Available 
Anderberg (1973) combines those two classifications to obtain a cross-classifi-
cation that may be illustrated by a contingency table. Note that it is impossible to 
have a nominal-continuous variable. Moreover, ordinal-continuous and interval-
'continuous variables are rare in practice. Table 2.1 indicates the types of variables 
available in our data set immediately after the data selection stage. 
This table shows that the data set contains four types of variables but no con-
tinuous variables. Moreover, the data set do es not contain any ordinal variables 
and binary variables are aIl nominal. The next section discusses sorne ways to 
transform ratio-discrete, interval-discrete, nominal-discrete, and nominal-binary 
to solve sorne issues. 
2.2. DATA TRANSFORMATION 
In Chapter 1, we introduced the reader to a typical data mining process. The 
current project supposes the completion of the first three steps (data cleaning, 
data integration, and data selection) of this process. The fourth step is about 
transforming the data in order to perform subsequent statistical analyses. An-
derberg (1973) ovèrviews a wide range ofmethods to transform variables. For 
instance, he identifies several methods to obtain a nominal variable from an ordi-
nal one, an ordinal from a nominal, and so on. We give here sorne transformations 
relevant to our project. 
The previous cross-classification shows a hierarchy between each type of vari-
ables. For instance, a ratio variable gives more information than a nominal 
variable. It is usually preferable to have an high-information variable than a 
low-information variable, but it is not always true. For example, it is sometimes 
necessary to transform a continuous variable into a discrete variable because a 
particular statistical method works only with the latter type. This transformation 
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process is called discretization. However, this section only considers transforma-
tions used to upgrade the level of information. Explanations on discretization are 
provided only when required. 
2.2.1. Ratio-discrete and interval-discrete variables 
Except for ratio variables, interval variables give the highest level of infor-
mation. One important issue to consider with those variables is the possible 
difference between the units of the variables. For instance, a data set that con-
tains two variables such that one variable is expressed in US dollars and the other 
in Yen is difficult to manage. A way to solve this problem is to transform those 
two variables on a same scale. This type of transformation is called standardiza-
tion. There are two common ways to standardize variables. The first common 
method is to use the Z-score standardization. This transformation is given by the 
following equation: 
Xi - f-L 
Zi = , 
cr 
where Xi is the value of observation i on variable X, f-L is the mean of X, and cr 
is the standard deviation of X. This method is analogous to the transformation 
of an arbitrary normal distribution with mean f-L and variance cr2 into a standard 
normal distribution with me an 0 and variance 1. We usually expect IZil ~ 3 for 
most observations. Furthermore, values outside this range are usually considered 
outliers. 
A second common method, called min-max normalization, 1S given by the 
following equation: 
X* = Xi - min {X} 
t 6
x
' 
where Xi is the value of observation i on variable X, min {X} is the minimal 
value on variable X, and, 6x is the range of values on variable X. Unlike the 
previous transformation, this method maps aIl values on a [0,1] scale. Note that 
this method works if all Xi are finite. 
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2.2.2. Nominal variables 
The Z-score standardization and the min-max normalization are inappropri-
ate transformations for nominal variables. For example, it do es not make sense 
to standardize the policyholder's gender variable. This subsection on nominal 
variables discusses two approaches to handle nominal variables. 
A first common way to deal with a nominal variable with two categories is to 
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transform it on a binary 0-1 scale. For example, we can code the policyholder's 
gender variable such that a female value is coded as zero and a male value is 
coded as one. However, this coding is very arbitrary. One may code without 
any difficulties a male value as 0.5. Wh en prior information on the variable is 
available, it is possible to find an appropriate value. Most of the time, however, 
one uses data mining to explore a data set with no prior information or knowledge. 
This method is not a problem for statistical analyses like regression because they 
are invariant to any binary transformations. Cluster analysis does not have this 
property. Therefore, another method is usually preferred. 
Another approach is to transform a nominal variable into an ordinal variable. 
A common way to do this ls to use a reference variable. Suppose again the poli-
cy.holder's gender variable. Clearly, all we can say is that a policyholder is similar 
or different from another, that is, a male or a female. Now, suppose we know 
that a male policyholder has usually a higher premium than a female policyholder 
does. VVe may now rank the policyholders using this reference variable. Only the 
perspective is changing. 
This section introduced sorne common transformations to deal with interval 
and nominal variables. From now on, we consider the min-max normalization for 
the interval variables and the reference variable method for the nominal variables. 
We use this last method because it allows us to use the RIDIT transformation, 
which is the subject of the next section. 
2.3. RIDIT 
RIDIT, a concept introduced by Bross (1958), stands for Relative to an Identi-
fied Distribution unIT. It is a linear transformation that gives empirical values to 
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the categories of an ordinal variable. In other words, it may be used to obtain an 
interval variable from an ordinal variable using its empirical distribution. Bross 
(1958) gives the following definition of a RIDIT. 
Definition 2.8. Suppose X is a discrete-ordinal variable with k possible values. 
Let Px = (PXl, PX2, ... ; PXk) denote the vector of observed proportions for the k 
possible values of variable X. The RIDIT score for the category i of variable X 
is given by the following tmnsfor'mation: 
Brockett et al. (2002) use a slightly different definition of a RIDIT. 
Definition 2.9. Suppose X is a diserete-ordinal variable with k possible values. 
Let Px = (PXl,PX2,'" ,PXk) denote the vector of observed proportions for the 
k possible values of variable X. The modified RIDIT score for the category i of 
variable X is given by the following tmnsformation: 
BXi = LPXj - LPXj j<i j>i 
= 2 LPXj -1 + PXi j<i 
= 2 (L:PXj + ~PXi) -1 
J<~ 
= 2Rxi - 1. 
The modified RIDIT is used throughout this thesis. 
Example 2.1 
Suppose X is the degree of satisfaction of a policyholder toward its insurance 
company. Table 2.2 shows the empirical distribution of a random sample of 100 
observations. 
For instance, the RIDIT value for the Satisfied (i = 2) is computed as follows: 
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TAB. 2.2. Data set for Example 2.1 
1 i 1 Category 1 ni 1 PXi 1 
1 Very satisfied 25 0.25 
2 Satisfied 59 0.59 
3 U nsatisfied 15 0.15 
4 Very unsatisfied 1 0.01 
Total 1100 11.00 1 
B X2 = LPXj - LPXj, j = 1,2,3,4. 
j<2 j>2 
= PX1 - PX3 - PX4 
= 0.25 - 0.15 - 0.01 
= 0.09 
Table 2.3 gives the RIDIT values of the four categories after the transformation. 
TAB. 2.3. RIDIT values for Example 2.1 
1 i 1 Category 1 BXi 1 
1 Very satisfied -0.75 
2 Satisfied 0.09 
3 Unsatisfied 0.83 
4 Very unsatisfied 0.99 
The RIDIT transformation has three properties. First, a RIDIT transforms aIl 
variables into a [-1, 1] scale. It allows variables with different number of categories 
to be included into the same analysis. It also allows the comparaison of variables 
with different scales and units. Second, a RIDIT is relative to an empirical 
distribution. The analyst does not have to suppose a theoretical distribution. 
This is particularly useful when the identification of a theoretical distribution is 
difficult or impossible. Third, a property of the RIDIT transformation is that the 
mean of aIl BXi equals 0, that is 2:7=1 BXiPXi = O. This property ensures that 
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aIl RIDIT values are included in the [-1, 1] interval. U sing the data of Example 
2.1, we have 
k 
L BXi'ÎJXi = B X1 PXl + B X2 PX2 + B X3PX3 + B X4PX4 
i=l 
= -0.75 x 0.25 + 0.09 x 0.59 + 0.83 x 0.15 + 0.99 x 0.01 
=0. 
This section on the RIDIT transformation ends our discussion on the types 
of variables and their related issues. Vve return to the concept of RIDIT in 
Section 2.5. 
2.4. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
A large number of variables is usually a problem when using data mining 
because it makes difficult the interpretation of the results. Several methods exist 
to reduce the number of dimensions in a data set. Among aIl the reduction 
techniques, principal component analysis (PCA) is one of the most common in 
the literature. This is the topic of this section. First, it introduces the concept of 
principal components. It then introduces two of the main issue wh en performing 
PCA, namely, the selection of the input matrix, and the determination of the 
number of principal components. 
A PCA may be used for various purposes but two of them are more common 
(Jolliffe, 2002). As mentioned earlier, PCA is often used to reduce the number 
of variables in a data set. This is why we use PCA in this project. Another 
common use of PCA is to transform a set of correlated variables into a new set of 
uncorrelated variables. Other applications of the PCA exist but are less common. 
The data set used for this project has initiaIly more than sixt Y variables. 
Performing an analysis using aIl those variables could be quite difficult or even 
impossible. An interesting solution would be to have fewer variables without 
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losing too mu ch information. Before continuing, we define the concept of total 
univariate variance. 
Definition 2.10. Let ~ denote a covariance matrix of order p associated with 
a n x p data set, denoted by X, where n is the number of observations and p is 
the number of variables. The total univariate variance of X, denoted by T [X], is 
given by the trace of~, which is the sum of the p diagonal elements of~. 
In the previous definition, we can replace ~ by P in case of a correlation 
matrix. The reader should note that the notation T [X] is used instead of V [X] 
in order to make a clear distinction between the variance of X and the univariate 
variance of X. 
The idea behind PCA is that sorne variables are less important than others 
in explaining the total univariate variance of a data set. For instance, a variable 
with only one possible value do es not explain any proportion of this total variance. 
Therefore, this variable may be deleted without changing the total variance. That 
is the extreme case. Sorne variables may contribute to a lower degree to the total 
univariate variance of a data set and therefore deleting them would result in losing 
little information and gaining effectiveness. A PCA reduces this dimensionality 
by determining new variables that are called principal components. We give a 
definition of the kth principal component. 
Definition 2.11. For each k = 1,2; ... ,n, let V [Zk] denote the variance of the 
kth principal component Z k. Let a~ = (akX l' akX2' ... , akXp ) den ote the vector 
of coefficients of the original variable Xi where i = 1,2, ... ,p for Zk' The kth 
principal component Zk is a linear combination of the p original variables: 
P 
Zk = a~X = LakXiXi (2.4.1) 
i=1 
such that V[Zk] is maximal, Cov [Zk, Zk-1] = 0 for k = 2, ... ,p and a~ak = 1. 
The last condition ensures that the coefficients of a are finite. 
It can be shown that the solution to equation (2.4.1) is ak = ek where ek is 
the kth eigenvector of :E such that À 1 2: À2 2: ... 2: Àk 2: 0 and e~ek = 1 (or 
Ilekll = 1) for aIl k = 1,2, ... ,p (see Jolliffe (2002)). Therefore, the first principal 
component is Z1 = e~ X, the second principal component is Z2 = e;X, and so on. 
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Note that the kth principal component is not necessarily unique because there 
may be multiple solutions of the variance of Zk. 
The most common measure to assess the importance of the kth principal 
component is to compute the proportion of the total univariate variance T [X] 
that is explained by V [Zk]. From the previous section, we know that the trace 
of a covariance matrix is equal to the sum of aIl its eigenvalues. Therefore, this 
measure may be given by: 
This measure is often used to choose the appropriate number of principal 
components. This issue is covered later in this section. 
It is easy to show that V [Zk] = Àk for k = 1,2, ... ,p and that COy [Zk, Zk-l] = 
o for k = 2, ... , p. Before doing this, the reader should know that e~ek = 1 for 
k = 1,2, ... , p and that e~ek-l = 0 for k = 2, ... , p. Furthermore, the following 
proposition is needed. 
Proposition 2.1. Let X and Y denote two random matrix. Let a and b denote 
two scalar vectors. Then, 
• V[aX] = a'V[X] a, 
• Cov[a'X, b'Y] = a'Cov[X, Y] b, 
• Cov[X,X] = V[X]. 
We now prove that V [Zk] = Àk for k = 1,2, ... ,p. 
PROOF. 
= e~V [X]ek 
Then, we prove the identity COy [Zk, Zk-l] = 0 for k = 2, ... ,p. 
PROOF. 
COy [Zk, Zk-l] = COy [e~X, e~_IX] 
= e~Cov [X, X] ek-l 
= e~ V [X] ek-l 
=0 
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In practice, the covariance matrix ~ is usually unknown. Therefore, the 
covariance matrix :E has to be estimated. A common estimator of :E is given by 
the sample covariance S. Here is its definition. 
Definition' 2.12. Let x' = (Xl' X2,' .. ,xn ) denote a random sample of n obser-
vations. Let x denote the sample mean of x. The sample covariance matrix S is 
defined by: 
S = L~=l (Xi - X)(Xi - X)'. 
n-l 
If the correlation matrix P is used instead of the covariance matrix, a common 
estimator of P is given by the sample correlation matrix R. This estimator is 
usually computed using the following identity: 
Here is an example of a principal component analysis using a random sam pIe 
and an unknown correlation matrix. 
Example 2.2 
Consider three variables Xl, X 2 , and X 3 generated from a normal distribution 
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with me an 0 and variance 1 where P X 1X2 = -0.9, PX1X3 = -0.5 and P X 2X 3 = 0.5. 
We assume that the correlation matrix P is unknown. We obtain the following 
sample correlation matrix: 
( 
1.0000 
R = -0.9013 
-0.5141 
-0.9013 -0.5141) 
1.0000 0.4764 . 
0.4764 1.0000 
The three eigenvalues of R are the solutions to the characteristic equation. Most 
statistical softwares have the capability to solve this matrix equation. A possible 
solution is À 1 = 2.2836, À2 = 0.6189, and À3 = 0.0976. Those eigenvalues give the 
following eigenvectors, (0.6248 -0.6165 -0.4791)', (0.3069 -0.3703 0.8768)' 
and (0.7180 0.6948 0.0422)'. Therefore, the three principal components are: 
Zl = 0.6248X1 - 0.6165X2 - 0.4791X3 , 
Z2 = 0.3069X1 - 0.3703X2 + 0.8768X3 , 
Z3 = 0.7180X1 + 0.6948X2 + 0.0422X3 · 
(2.4.2) 
(2.4.3) 
(2.4.4) 
Note that sorne softwares (like R) give the standard deviations of the principal 
components instead of their eigenvalues. To obtain those values, we square the 
standard deviations. AIso, the proportion of the total univariate variance that is 
explained by Zl is given by: 
Àl 2.2836 
L:=l Ài 2.2836 + 0.6189 + 0.0976 
= 0.7612 
= 76.12%. 
Similarly, we find that the second and third principal components explain 20.63% 
and 3.25%, respectively. Equation 2.4.2 shows that the first principal component 
Zl explains most of the variation of both X 2 and X 3 while equation 2.4.3 shows 
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that the variation of X3 is largely explained by the second component Z2. Such 
conclusions are drawn by comparing the coefficients of the two equations. 
An important issue when using PCA to reduce the number of variables is to 
determine an appropriate number of principal components. 
> 2.4.1. Number of principal components 
A PCA performed on a data set of 20 variables gives 20 principal components. 
The objective of PCA is to reduce the number of variables, that is, it makes no 
sense to replace 20 variables with 20 principal components. Unfortunately, there 
are no clear rules to determine an appropriate number of principal components. 
The literature proposes three methods to do this (Timm, 2002). A first method 
is to select the principal components with eigenvalues higher than one. Using 
this rule of thumb, we would select one principal compone nt in Example 2.2. 
Secondly, one may select the principal components that explain at least 70% of 
the total variance of the data set. Using this criterion, we would also select one 
principal component in the example. A third method is to use a scree plot. A 
common ru le of thumb is to select the first principal components until a large 
decrease in variances (or eigenvalues) occurs. For instance, Figure 2.1 suggests 
one principal component. In this case, aIl three methods suggest to cnoose one 
principal component, that is, Zl. 
a 
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FIG. 2.1. Scree plot for Example 2.2. 
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AIl principal components share sorne properties. A first property is that 
aIl principal components are uncorrelated, namely, Cov [Zk, Zk-l] = 0 for k = 
2, ... ,p. This property was shown earlier in this chapter. A second property 
is that aIl principal cornponents are orthogonal. From linear algebra, we know 
that aIl eigenvectors are orthogonal. Since the coefficients of a principal compo-
nent form an eigenvector, aU their coefficients are also orthogonal and their scalar 
product is zero. Using the principal components Zl and Z2 of Example 2.2, we 
have 
3 
0:~ 0:2 = L 0:1i0:2i 
i=l 
= 0.6248 x 0.3069 - 0.6165 x (-0.3703) x -0.4791 x (0.8768) 
= O .
. In the same manner, it is possible to show that Zl and Z3 are orthogonal and 
also that Z2 and Z3 are orthogonal. A second important issue to consider with 
PCA is the selection of an input matrix. This issue is now covered. 
2.4.2. Input matrix 
PCA first requires the selection of an input matrix. This section covers the two 
most common input matrices, that is, the covariance matrix and the correlation 
matrix. 
A covariance matrix may be used as the input matrix for PCA. This input 
rnatrix gives different weights to variables with different variances. More precisely, 
a covariance rnatrix gives to a variable with a large variance a greater importance 
than a variable with a smaIl variance. This result is not surprising because it 
uses directly the definition of a covariance between two variables. A correlation 
matrix is also commonly used as the input matrix for PCA. However, the use of 
a correlation rnatrix gives equal weights to aIl variables. We obtain this result 
directly from the definition of a correlation, that is, an values are transformed 
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on a same [-1,1] scale. The choice of an input matrix depends on the context of. 
study and a priori information. 
This section introduced the principal component analysis as a way to reduce 
the number of variables in a data set. This statistical method may also be used 
as an iterative pro cess to detect fraudulent claims. This is the subject of the next 
section. 
2.5. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS OF RIDIT 
Brockett et al. (2002) propose an innovative method to detect fraudulent 
claims and identify variables that are the best indicators of fraud. They caU 
it the Principal Component Analysis of RIDITs method or sim ply the PRIDIT 
method. The name clearly states the nature of the method. It uses both concepts 
of principal component analysis and RIDIT. This section overviews the original 
1 
article of Brockett et al. (2002). More precisely, it discusses its goals, its assump-
tions, and the corresponding algorithm. We also give a complete ex ample of its 
use. 
The PRIDIT method has two main uses. First, the PRIDIT method gives an 
overaU suspicion score for each daim. Those scores may then be used to rank an 
daims based on their likelihood of fraud. The daim department may investigate 
only the daims ab ove a given suspicion score. The PRIDIT method may therefore 
help reduce the costs of investigating the incoming daims. Second, the PRIDIT 
may be used to assess the discriminatory power of each variable. 
The PRIDIT method makes one important assumption, that is, it assumes 
that aU variables are of a ranked-order categorical nature. Using the terminol-
ogy introduced at the beginning of this chapter, the variables are assumed to be 
discrete-ordinal. Moreover, aU categories of a variable must be ordered in a de-
creasing likelihood of fraud suspicion. Consider, for example, the driver's gender 
variable after we transformed it into an ordinal variable using fraud suspicion as 
a reference variable. The reader is referred to Section 2.2 for a definition of a 
reference variable. There are evidences that a man is more likely to commit a 
fraudulent daim th an a woman is. Therefore, a man must have a lower value 
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. than a woman must on the variable. An example would be to give a value of zero 
to a man and a value of one to a woman. 
The PRIDIT method is an easy-to-understand procedure composed of two 
preliminary steps and an algorithm. The first preliminary step is to compute a 
RIDIT score for each category of an variables. For instance, three binary variables 
require the computation of six RIDITs. The second step is to replace each value 
of the data set by its corresponding RIDIT value. This "new" data set, denoted 
by F, is a n x m matrix where n is the number of daims and m is the number of 
variables. Once those two steps are completed, the PRIDIT algorithm begins. 
Let fit denote the RIDIT score of daim i on variable t (i = 1,2, ... , n and 
t = 1,2, ... , m). In addition, let W(O) denote a m x 1 vector consisting only 
of one. A first n x 1 vector of suspicion scores, denoted by S(O) is given by the 
pro du ct of the matrix F and the vector W(O), that is: 
S(O) is the vector of suspicion scores when an variables have the same weights. 
However, sorne variables are better indicators of fraud. A vector of nones may 
therefore be inappropriate. According to Brockett et al. (2002), a better vector 
of weights may be given by: 
F'S(O) 
W (1) - .,-------:--,-,-
- IIF'S(O)II' 
where IIF'S(O)II is the Eudidean norm of F'S(O). Then, this new vector may be 
used to obtain a more precise vector of suspicion scores by the following elemen-
tary operation: 
By repeating those steps, we obtain W(2), S(2), W(3), and so on. The process 
may be repeated until convergence is reached. In practice, we repeat the pro cess 
q times. When q is reached, we obtain the two vectors S(q) and W(q). The 
component Si(q) of the n x 1 vector S(q) is the suspicion score for daim i. In other 
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words, a suspicion score for daim i is given by Si = 2:::;:1 fitWt. The component 
Wi(q) of the m x 1 vector W(q) is the weight to give to variable t. As any other 
consistency measure, a high value indicates a high consistency while a low value 
indicates a low consistency of variable t with respect to the suspicion score. Here is 
an ex ample of how the PRIDIT method works with a random data set. Appendix 
provides our R version of the PRIDIT algorithm. 
Example 2.3 
Consider the data set of Table 2.4. The categories of the three variables are 
ranked such that a higher category is related with a lesser degree of fraud. For 
instance, a value of 0 on variable X3 means a high likelihood of fraud while a 
value of 3 means a low likelihood of fraud. Table 2.5 gives the RIDIT values for 
the categories of those three variables. Table 2.6 shows how we transform the 
values of daim i = 1 into RIDIT values. 
TAB. 2.4. Data set for Example 2.3 
1 1 1 3 
2 1 2 3 
3 1 2 3 
4 0 0 1 
5 1 0 2 
6 1 1 3 
7 1 1 0 
8 1 2 3 
9 1 1 1 
10 1 0 2 
TAB. 2.5. RIDIT values for each category of Example 2.3 
1 Category 1 Xl 1 X2 1 X3 1 
0 -0.9 -0.7 -0.9 
1 0.1 0.0 -0.6 
2 - 0.7 -0.2 
3 - - 0.5 
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TAB. 2.6. RIDIT transformation of daim i = 1 for Example 2.3. 
We now replace aIl values of the data set with their corresponding RIDIT values 
to obtain the RIDIT matrix: 
0.1 0.0 0.5 
0.1 0.7 0.5 
0.1 0.7 0.5 
-0.9 -0.7 -0.6 
0.1 -0.7 -0.2 
F= 
0.1 0.0 0.5 
0.1 0.0 -0.9 
0.1 0.7 0.5 
0.1 0.0 -0.6 
0.1 -0.7 -0.2 
Once F is computed, we begin the PRIDIT algorithm. First, we compute S(O) = 
FW(O). 
The next step is to compute the vector W(1). 
0.6 
1.3 
1.3 
-2.2 
-0.8 
0.6 
-0.8 
1.3 
-0.5 
-0.8 
0.2816 
0.6899 
0.6669 
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After, we compute S(1), W(2), S(2) and so on until convergence is reached. In 
practice, we usuaIly set a fixed number of iteration of the process. For example, 
we obtain after 10 iterations: 
and 
selO) = FW(lO) = 
(
0.2261) 
0.6992 
0.6783 
0.3617 
0.8512 
0.8512 
-1.0999 
-0.6025 
0.3617 
-0.5878 
0.8512 
-0.3843 
-0.6025 
After 10 iterations, this algorithm gives us the discriminatory ability of the three 
variables which is given by W(lO). In this example, variables t = 2 and t = 3 are 
good indicators of fraud with values of 0.6992 and 0.6783 while variable t = 1 is 
a poor indicator with a value of 0.2261. This algorithm gives also the suspicion 
scores for the 10 daims. For instance, the suspicion score for daim i = 1 is 0.3617. 
In other words, this daim is more suspicious than a daim with a 0.8512 value 
but less suspicious than a daim with a value of -1.0999. 
As mentioned earlier, the PRIDIT algorithm may be used to dassify aIl daims 
based on their suspicious scores. Table 2.7 shows the suspicion scores for the 10 
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daims in a decreasing order of fraud likelihood. Brockett et al. (2002) propose 
to select the negative values as the fraudulent daims and the positive values as 
the non-fraudulent daims. Therefore, five daims may be considered as fraudulent 
and the same number as non-fraudulent. The insurance company should therefore 
investigate the five daims with negative values (i = 4,5,7,9,10). 
TAB. 2.7: Claims of Example 2.3 in a decreasing order of fraud likelihood. 
1 Claim 1 Suspicion score 1 
4 -1.0999 
5 -0.6025 
10 -0.6025 
7 -0.5878 
9 -0.3843 
1 0.3617 
6 0.3617 
2 0.8512 
3 0.8512 
8 0.8512 
Brockett et al. (2002) show that the PRIDIT algorithm converges, that is, 
the two sequences {W(i)}~l and {S(i)}~l converge. We however do not discuss 
this convergence property in this thesis. In fact, this property uses the concept 
of unique variance which is covered in factor analysis. Although factor analysis 
is similar to peA, a discussion of this method is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
This method has many interesting properties. We now discuss four of them. 
First, PRIDIT is an unsupervised method as discussed at the end of Chapter 1. 
Therefore, it may be used when there are no outcome variables. Second, it works 
with discrete-ordinal variables, which are usually the most common variables in a 
data set of daims. Third, one may indude many variables with varying number 
of categories within the same analysis because aIl variables are transformed onto 
a [-1, 1] scale. Finally, the PRIDIT method is simple and easy to implement in 
a business context, which is a more than important point to any company. A 
mathematically complex technique would not be applicable. 
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This chapter covered three main topies. It began with a discussion on the 
types of variables usually found in a data set. We exposed the cross-classification 
proposed by Anderberg (1973), which combines two common classifications into a 
sin'gle classification. The chapter then discussed sorne ways to transform a given 
variable into another type. An emphasis was given to the RIDIT transformation. 
Third, we highlighted main issues on principal component analysis. The chapter 
ends with an overview of the PRIDIT method to detect fraudulent claims. This 
method is interesting because it helps the company to allocate its limited re-
sources (financial and human) to the investigation of the most suspicious claims. 
Chapter 4 shows that this method works with real data, 
Chapter 3 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
This chapter covers the broad field of cluster analysis. Unlike the principal com-
ponent analysis of RIDITs method (PRIDIT) introdJced in the second chapter, 
a cluster analysis is not specifically designed to detect insurance fraud. They are 
general methods to obtain new knowledge when no previous information on a 
dependent variable is available. 
o 
The idea behind cluster analysis is simple. Given a data set, it creates clusters 
of observations in a way to both maximize the similarity of observations of a 
cluster or group and maximize the dissimilarity of observations between different 
clusters or groups. For instance, an insurer may group aIl its policyholders in 
a way that similar policyholders are included in the same cluster and dissimilar 
policyholders are in distinct clusters. In that case, there are no predefined classes 
of policyholders such as high-risk and low-risk policyholders. In other words, 
obtained clusters have no label attached to them. This last task pertains to 
classification methods and not to clustering techniques. This issue was exposed 
in the first chapter. 
The use of dustering techniques in this project on fraud detection is subject 
to the following warning. A clustering technique identifies patterns when no 
information on a dependent variable (fraud status) is available. However, those 
patterns are not necessarily caused by differences between fraudulent and non-
fraudulent daims. Therefore, a daim adjuster (or any other knowledgeable person 
in insurance fraud) must interpret the results. Among other things, he has to 
assess the relevance to insurance fraud of the dusters. 
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This chapter has the following structure. The first section gives an overview 
of the main concepts on cluster analysis. Then, it discusses the quantification of 
the proximity between two observations. It also briefly introduces clustering of 
variables and common classifications of clustering techniques. Next, it introduces 
the two main types of clustering techniques, that is, agglomerative hierarchical 
clustering techniques and nonhierarchical techniques through the k-means algo-
rithm. The chapter ends with a discussion on the determination of the number 
of clusters and the relation between principal component and cluster analyses. 
3.1. DEFINITIONS AND USES OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
This section overviews the main concepts underlyihg cluster analysis. First, 
it gives a common definition of cluster. It then discusses sorne possible uses of a 
cluster analysis. Finally, it makes a distinction between crisp and fuzzy clustering 
techniques. 
Everitt (1980) gives the following definition of a cluster. 
Definition 3.1. A cluster is defined as a group of contiguous elements of a sta-
tistical population; for example, a group of people living in a single house, a 
consecutive run of observations in an ordered series, or a set of adjacent plots in 
one part of a field. 
A cluster analysis is therefore performed to obtain clusters. More precisely, 
a cluster analysis is a tool to explore a large data s~t. Its main objective is 
the discovery of new knowledge by the generation of new hypotheses for a more 
precise study or by the identification of patterns in the data. A cluster analysis is 
also useful to create classification schemes like those commonly found in zoology 
and other biological sciences. Although the main function of a cluster ana~ysis 
is not to predict but to discover new patterns, it is however possible to perform 
predictive analyses. For example, if a claim adjuster finds the clusters relevant to 
the prediction of the fraudulent status of a claim, he may classify future claims 
based on those last clusters. Finally, Jobson (1992) uses the cluster analysis as a 
data reduction technique. 
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There is a wide variety of clustering techniques. Broadly, the literature on 
computational pattern recognition identifies two types of cluster analyses. On 
one hand, a crisp cluster analysis creates mutuaIly exclusive clusters. In other 
words, a given observation is included into a unique cluster. On the other hand, a 
fuzzy cluster analysis allows the observations to be in two, three, or more clusters. 
We performed both types of methods. However, this Master's thesis presents only 
the results obtained by common crisp clustering techniques. 
This section introduced sorne fundamentals of cluster analysis. A definition 
of both cluster and clustering concepts and the possible uses of a cluster analysis 
were the covered concepts. 
3.2. PROXIMITY MEASURES 
Any cluster analysis needs to quantify the proximity between two objects in 
a p-dimensional space. The quantification of the proximity between two objects 
is made through two different types of measures. On one hand, there are dissimi-
larity measures. This type of measures quantifies the difference (or dissimilarity) 
between two objects. Therefore, two dissimilar objects are given a high value of 
dissimilarity while two similar objects are given a low value of dissimilarity. On 
the other hand, there are similarity measures. This type of measures quantifies 
the similarity instead of the dissimilarity between two objects. Wh en using this 
type of measures, two similar objects are given a high value of similarity while 
two dissimilar objects are given a low value of similarity. Those two types of mea-
sures are both part of a more general type of measures referred to as proximity 
measures, According to this classification, this section is divided in two parts. 
The first one covers dissimilarity measures while the second part covers similar-
ity measures. Note that most clustering techniques use a dissimilarity measure. 
However, a similarity me as ure is often needed wh en sorne or aIl variables are bi-
nary. This section also gives sorne approaches to handle a data set with different 
types of variables. 
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3.2.1. Dissimilarity measures 
Let p denote the number of variables. Let r, s, and q denote three objects in 
the p-dimensional space. Let drs den ote the distance between rand s. Here is 
the definition of a dissimilarity measure. 
Definition 3.2. A dissimilarity measure satisfies the following three axioms: 
drs 2: 0, Vr, s, 
drs = 0 {::} r = s, 
Those three axioms are called positivity, refiexivity, and symmetry, respec-
tively. A measure satisfying those last three axioms is. also called a semi-metric 
by sorne authors (Timm, 2002). 
It is possible to add a fourth axiom to the previous definition to obtain a 
metric. Here's its definition. 
Definition 3.3. A metric satisfies the following four axioms: 
drs 2: 0, Vr, s, 
drs = 0 {::} r = s, 
This fourth axiom is called the triangle inequality. Furthermore, it is possible 
to replace this last axiom by a new one to obtain an ultrametric. A formaI 
definition of this term is now given. 
Definition 3.4. An ultrametric satisfies the following four axioms: 
drs 2: 0, Vr, s, 
drs = 0 {::} r = s 
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The foUowing proposition is useful to identify the type of measure. 
Proposition 3.1. A measure that satisfies all four axioms of an ultrametric is 
also a dissimilarity measure (semi-metric) and a metric. 
The literature proposes many dissimilarity measures for continuous variables. 
The Minkowski distance (or Lp - norm) is however used to derive most popular 
measures. Its definition is now given. 
Definition 3.5. Let Yr and Ys denote two objects of the p-dimensional space. The 
Minkowski distance is given by: 
1 
drs = (t IYrj - ySjl>'):;;, À > O. 
J=l 
Note that p ~ 1. It is easy to show that the Minkowski distance satisfies 
the four axioms of an ultrametric. Two common special cases of the Minkowski 
distance are the Euclidean and the Manhattan distances where À = 2 and À = 1, 
respectively. In the literature, the former me as ure is, by far, the most frequently 
used. Its intuitive simplicity and relation to classical geometry might be one of 
the reasons. As it will be seen later, the most popular do es not me an being the 
most efficient in aU circumstances. To state things properly, the definition of the 
Euclidean distance is now given. Note that it is obtained by setting À = 2 in the 
previous definition. 
Definition 3.6. Let Yr and Ys denote two objects of the p-dimensional space. The 
Euclidean distance is given by: 
p 
drs = 2:)Yrj - Ysj)2. 
j=l 
Since the Euclidean distance is a special case of the more general Minkowski 
measure, it is an ultrametric. By using Proposition 3.1, the Euclidean distance 
is also a dissimilarity measure and a metric. It is often convenient to express the 
Euclidean distance in a matrix form. 
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Definition 3.7. Let y r and Ys denate twa abjects in the p-dimensianal space. 
The Euclidean distance is given by: 
The Euclidean distance is not always appropriate because of an important 
scale-unit problem. Suppose the foUowing two variables. The first variable is 
the indemnity given to a claimant and the other is the age of this claimant. The 
former variable may range between $0 and $200,000, while the latter variable may 
range between 15 and 85. Obviously, more weight is given to the former than the 
latter variable when computing the distance between the data for two claimants. 
We say that the Euclidean distance is not invariant in scale unit. Fortunately, 
there are many solutions to solve this scaling problem. The main solution is to 
standardize variables, as explained in the second chapter. This scaling problem 
affects aU Minkowski-based distances at sorne degree. In fact, a high value for À 
increases the importance of the problem while a lower value decreases it. 
A second special case of the Minkowski distance, wh en À = 1, is caUed the 
Manhattan distance. Sorne authors prefer the use of city-black or taxi-cab distance 
(Timm, 2002). Here is the formaI definition. 
Definition 3.8. Let Yr and Ys denate twa abjects af the p-dimensianal space. The 
Manhattan di8tance i8 given by: 
p 
drs = L IYrj - YSjl· 
j=1 
Since the Manhattan distance is a special case of the more general Minkowski 
distance, the Manhattan distance is an ultrametric. By Proposition 3.1, we find 
that the Manhattan distance is also a me tric and a semi-metric. The Manhattan 
distance is more robust to outliers than the Euclidean distance. Intuitively, the 
exponent À = 2 associated with the Euclidean distance gives outliers more weight 
than the À = 1 associated to the Manhattan distance. 
The previous measures are aU derived from a more general measure, that is, 
the Minkowski distance. They therefore share sorne characteristics. As explained 
before, aU Minkowski-based measures share the scale unit problem. Second, the 
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distance between two observations on a variable do es not affect its counterpart on 
another variable. Therefore, aIl those measures assume independence of variables. 
Other dissimilarity measures are found in the literature. While most of them 
are metric measures, there are also nonmetric measures. They differ by not 
satisfying the fourth axiom of a metric. The attention is however restricted in this 
Master's thesis to me tric measures. Those interested in nonmetric dissimilarity 
measures for interval variables may read Anderberg (1973). 
Dissimilarity measures are one type of proximity measures. They are usually 
designed to deal with continuous variables and most discrete variablés. Binary 
variables and discrete variables with few categories are usually best handled with 
similarity measures. However, a particular emphasis is given here to binary vari-
ables. 
3.2.2. Similarity measures 
As mentioned earlier, there are two types of proximity measures: dissimilar-
ity and similarity measures. This second part of the section covers similarity 
measures. They are sometimes called correlation-type measures because they are 
smaller or equal, in absolute value, to one (Jobson, 1992). Here is the definition 
of a similarity measure. 
Definition 3.9. Let rand S denote two objects in the p-dimensional space. Let 
Srs den ote th~ similarity measure between rand s. A similarity measure satisjies 
the following three axioms: 
ISrsl ::; 1, \fr, s, 
Srs = 1 {:} r = s, 
The following proposition is the link between dissimilarity and similarity mea-
sures. 
Proposition 3.2. The relation between a similarity measure and a dissimilarity 
measure is given by: 
1 
Srs = ----:--1 + drs · 
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The most common similarity measure is the Pearson correlation coefficient, 
which is now defined. 
Definition 3.10. Let Yr and Ys denote two objects of the p-dimensional space. 
The Pearson correlation coefficient is given by: 
where Y- = 2:;-1 YTi and y- = 2:;-1 Ysi • 
~ p s. p 
A similarity measure is most of the time transformed into a dissimilarity mea-
sure since most clustering techniques use this last type of measure. Moreover, 
most statistical softwares, like the SAS®CLUSTER procedure, use dissimilarity 
measures. Therefore, similarity measures are usually less important than dissim-
ilarity measures. The situation is however different when a data set contains at 
least one binary variable. This issue is now considered. 
3.2.3. Discrete variables 
In an insurance context, available variables are usually discrete or even binary 
variables. This section first introduces common similarity measures used when 
the. data set contains binary variables. It then discusses similarity measures for 
nominal and ordinal variables. This section assumes that a binary variable is 
coded as one if a given characteristic is present and zero if it is absent. The 
reader may refer to Section 2.1 for an explanation of the differences between the 
types of discrete variables. There is a wide range of similarity measures for binary 
variables. However, they are all based on Table 3.1. 
TAB. 3.1. Contingency table for the similarity coefficients 
1 0 Total 
1 a b a+b 
0 c d c+d 
Total a+c b+d q=a+b+c+d 
Using this contingency table, a similarity measure may be obtained for each 
pair of variables. Timm (2002) introduces nine similarity measures to handle 
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binary variables. They differ by the weights associated to each variable of a pair. 
In this Master's thesis, we consider only the simple matching measure. Here is 
the definition. 
Definition 3.11. Let a, b, c, d, and q be frequencies as represented in Table 3.1. 
The simple mat ching measure is given by 
a+d 
q 
This similarity measure gives equal weights to pairs with (0 - 0) matches. 
Using the relation between- a similarity and a dissimilarity measure and the defi-
nit ion of a metric, it is easy to show that the dissimilarity measure corresponding 
to the simple mat ching coefficient is actually a metric. An example of the use 
of dustering with binary variables and the simple matching coefficient is now 
exposed. 
Example 3.1 
Consider the two daims of Table 3.2 such that X 1 ,X2 ,X3 , and X 4 are four binary 
variables. 
TAB. 3.2. Data set for Example 3.1 
1 
1 ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 2 
Those data may be arranged using the contingency table shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.3 shows a similar contingency table for this example. 
TAB. 3.3. Contingency table for Example 3.1 
1 0 Total 
1 1 1 2 
0 1 1 2 
Total 2 2 q=4 
In this simple example, a = b = c = d = 1 and q = 4. Therefore, the similarity 
coefficient between both daims is ~. 
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A data set more than likely contains sorne nominal variables. Xu and Wunsch 
II (2005) propose two strategies to handle such variables. A first strategy is to 
transform aIl nominal variables as binary (or dummy) variables and to apply the 
previous procedure. For example, one may transform the type of insurance (car, 
moto, or home) variable into three new dummy variables. A second strategy is 
to use the mat ching criterion: 
1 p 
5rs = - L 5rsi , 
p i=l 
where 5rsi = 1, if rand s match and 5rsi = 0 if rand s do not match. Here is an 
example that illustrates the use of this second strategy. 
Example 3.2 
Consider the two claims of Table 3.4 where i = 1 den ote the policyholder's lan-
guage, i = 2 denote the model of the insured vehicle, and i = 3 denote the 
policyholder's gender. This information is typically found in an insurance com-
pany data set of claims. 
TAB. 3.4. Data set for Example 3.2 
The similarity measure between claims 1 and 2 is 
1 
512 = 3(5121 + 5122 + 5123 ), 
1 
= 3(1 + 0 + 1), 
2 
3 
Finally, a data set may contain ordinal variables. Xu and Wunsch II (2005) 
propose to use a dissimilarity measure, like the Euclidean distance, to handle 
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this type of variables. AIso, Sokal and Sneath (1963) propose a particular cod-
ing of ordinal variables in binary variables. FinaIly, the RIDIT transformation 
introduced in Chapter 2 is an alternative. 
3.2.4. Data set with different types of variables 
From a data mining perspective, a data set usually contains many different 
types of variables. Many approaches are found in the literature to deal with 
this issue. This section discusses three of them. A first -approach is to perform 
a separate cluster analysis for each type of variable available in the data set 
(Anderberg, 1973). A second approach is to transform aIl variables into a same 
type of variables (Anderberg, 1973). Since conversion of types should be restricted 
to a minimum, variables should be transformed into the dominant variable type. 
Finally, Gower (1971) proposes to use the following Gower's similarity coefficient: 
where Sr si is the similarity measure between rand s in the ith dimensional space, 
where i = 1,2, ... ,p, and <5rsi = 0 if i is missing for either r or sand, <5 = 1 
otherwise. 
This section introduced common proximity measures. A dissimilarity me as ure 
is mainly used with continuous variables while a similarity measure is usually used 
with binary variables. This section finally discussed approaches to deal with a 
data set that contains many different types of variables. 
3.3. CLUSTERING OF VARIABLES 
There are two types of objects that may be grouped in clusters, namely, vari-
ables and observations. It is the reason why we referred to objects and not to 
observations in the previous sections. We wanted ta emphasize the fact that vari-
ables can also be clustered. The main objective of a cluster analysis on variables 
is to reduce its number. \Ve prefer the use of a principal component analysis. The 
reader interested in the clustering of variables is referred to Anderberg (1973). 
This chapter now discusses sorne clustering classifications. 
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3.4. CLUSTERING CLASSIFICATIONS 
The field of cluster analysis involves algorithms developed in various fields of 
study including biology, psychology, and sociology. There is an impressive number 
ofthem so that making a review of aIl clustering techniques is fastidious. In fact, 
comparisons of aIl existing algorithms may be a research subject by itself. Fortu-
nately, many classifications of cluster analysis techniques exist depending on the 
technique used to construct the clusters. However, sorne classifications and cat-
egories overlap because the distinction between them may be unclear. Cormack 
(1971) proposes a five-category classification: hiemrchical, optirnization, density 
or rnode-seeking, clurnping, and other techniques. According to this author, hier-
archical clustering techniques may be further divided between agglornemtive and 
divisive techniques. Sorne authors, like Timm (2002), propose a two-category 
classification that makes a distinction between agglornerative hierarchical cluster-
ing and nonhierarchical methods. The reader must also be aware that different 
techniques are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary. For instance, 
Timm (2002) suggests following hierarchical clustering with nonhierarchical clus-
tering to refine or validate the results. 
3.5. HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING TECHNIQUES 
This section introduces hierarchical clustering techniques. They are first con-
sidered because of their importance in the literature on data mining and mul-
tivariate analysis. AIl hierarchical clustering techniques follow the same idea. 
Given N objects, one merges or splits them in clusters that are themselves fur-
ther merged or split, and so on. This series of successive mergers or splits stops 
when a stopping criterion is satisfied. This criterion usually depends on the num-
ber of clusters denoted by k. Therefore, depending on the direction (mèrges or 
splits) of the process, there are two classes of hierarchical clustering techniques: 
agglornerative and divisive hierarchical clustering techniques. Note that Gordon 
(1987) considers two other classes of hierarchical clustering techniques: construc-
tive and direct optimization. They are however not discussed in this Master's 
thesis. 
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An agglomerative hierarchical clustering technique typically st arts with N 
objects and N clusters Cl, ... ,CN such that Ck =1- 0, k = 1, ... ,N. The two most 
similar clusters are merged to obtain N - 1 non-empty clusters. This step is then 
repeated until either the initial N objects are grouped in a single cluster or a 
stopping criterion is met. 
A divisive hierarchical clustering technique is similar but uses splits instead 
of merges. One starts with one cluster containing N objects. This cluster is then 
divided into two clusters according to one of the 2N -1 - 1 possible splits. One 
cluster therefore contains t objects while the other contains N - t objects. A 
similar split is performed again on those two clusters obtaining this time three 
clusters. One repeats this pro cess until the initial N objects are divided in N 
clusters Cl, ... ,CN such that Ck =1- 0, k = 1, ... ,N or a stopping criterion is met. 
This Master's thesis covers only the former type of methods, that is, ag-
glomerative hierarchical clustering techniques. The reader interested in divisive 
hierarchical clustering techniques may read Seber (1984). 
While not necessary to determine clusters, interpretation of hierarchical clus-
tering results is greatly simplified by using a dendrogram. It is also called a tree 
diagram. Figure 3.1 shows a typical dendrogram. Its use is quite simple. The 
tree illustrates successive splits or merges at each step of the selected pro cess 
whether agglomerative or divisive. The distance between clusters is indicated on 
the y-axis. Note that such a tool may not be appropriate when dealing with a 
large amount of objects. Gordon (1987) p'rovides a good discussion on that topic 
by comparing many types of dendrograms and giving mathematical foundations 
of them. 
According to Anderberg (1973), agglomerative hierarchical clustering tech-
niques may be themselves further divided. For instance, those- methods may be 
classified as linkage, centroids, and err·or sum of squares or variance methods. 
AlI methods may be used for clustering observations. However, onlya linkage 
method clusters variables. This section first introduces the three common linkage 
methods, namely, single linkage, complete linkage, and average linkage methods. 
Note that the three linkage methods differ only by the way the distance between 
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FIG. 3.1. A dendrogram 
two clusters is calculated. It then introduces the reader to the centroid method. 
It finally ends with the Ward's method, which is the more common error sum of 
squares or variance method. 
3.5.1. Single linkage 
The single linkage method has many other appellations. A common but dif-
ferent name is nearest neighbor method (Everitt, 1980). Let d(R)(S) denotes the 
distance between the clusters Rand S. The single linkage distance is given by 
the following equation: 
d(R)(S) = min drs , 
rER,sES 
where drs den otes the distance between the objects rand s. An example will help 
to understand how it works. 
Example 3.3 
Consider the following lower triangular distance matrix D. 
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1 2 3 4 5 
1 
2 3.16 
D 5X5 = 3 3.61 4.12 
4 7.07 8.94 5.00 
5 2.23 1.00 4.00 8.54 
First, we merge the two closest items (2 and 5). We denote this cluster (2;5). We 
then compute the distances between (2;5) and the three remaining items: 
d(2;5)1 = min(d21 , d 51 ) = min(3.16, 2.23) = 2.23, 
d(2;5)3 = min(d23 , d 53 ) = min(4.12, 4.00) = 4.00, 
d(2;5)4 = min(d24 , d 54 ) = min(8.94, 8.54) = 8.54. 
The lower triangular distance matrix is now reduced to: 
(2;5) 1 3 4 
(2;5) 
1 2.23 
D 4x4 = 
3 4.00 3.61 
4 8.54 7.07 5.00 
We again select the two most similar items, (2;5) and 1, merge them, and so 
on. We repeat this process until aIl objects are in the same cluster. Figure 3.2 
illustrates the final structure on a dendrogram. The method first merges the 
items 2 and 5. It then merges successively the items 1 and 3 to this new cluster. 
The method finally merges the item 4. 
The single linkage method has two main problems (Anderberg, 1973). First, 
this method is usually unable to separate close clusters. Second, this method 
tends to create ellipsoidal clusters. Therefore, two observations located at both 
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FIG. 3.2. Dendrogram for the single linkage example. 
extremities of an ellipsoidal cluster tends to be in the same cluster even if they 
are distant. This drawback of the single linkage method is called the chaining 
property. This property is sometimes an advantage instead of a disadvantage. 
For instance, Johnson and Wichern (2007) considers this method as one of the 
few clustering methods that can delineate non-ellipsoidal clusters. 
3.5.2. Complete linkage 
The complete linkage method, often called furthest neighbor method, is very 
similar to the single linkage method. As stated earlier, the two methods differ 
only by the way they define the distance between two objects. The distance 
between clusters Rand S is now defined by: 
d(R)(S) = max d rs , 
rER,sES 
where drs denotes the distance between the objects rand s. Here is an example. 
Example 3.4 
Consider the lower triangular distance matrix D of the previous example. By 
merging the items 2 and 5, we obtain the same (2;5) cluster. The distance between 
this cluster and the three remaining items are: 
d(2;5)1 = max(d21 , d 51 ) = max(3.16, 2.23) = 3.16, 
d(2;5)3 = max(d23 , d 53 ) = max(4.12, 4.00) = 4.12, 
d(2;5)4 = max(d24 , d 54 ) = max(8.94, 8.54) = 8.94. 
Therefore, the following 4 x 4 lmver triangular distance matrix is obtained. 
(2;5) 1 3 4 
(2;5) 
1 3.16 
D4x4 = 
3 4.12 3.61 
4 8.94 7.07 5.00 
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We repeat this pro cess until aIl items are in the same cluster. Figure 3.3 illustrates 
the clustering process on a dendrogram. The merging pro cess is exactly the same 
as the previous example but the distances between successive clusters are different. 
N 
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FIG. 3.3. Dendrogram for the complete linkage example. 
This result is however not surprising because both single and complete linkage 
methods are invariant to monotonie transformations of the proximity measures 
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(Anderberg, 1973). This property describes the fact that the structure of a den-
drogram do es not change when one uses either the former or the latter method. 
Johnson (1967) discusses this property. 
3.5.3. Average linkage 
Anderberg (1973) identifies two average linkage methods. The first method 
computes the distance of the items within the new cluster. The second method 
computes the distance of items between merged clusters. This section introduces 
the latter method only. Everitt (1980) caUs it the group average method. The 
reader interested by the first method can see Anderberg (1973). The distance 
between Rand Sis now given by the following expression: 
d . LrLsdrs (R)(S) = , 
nRnS 
where drs denotes the distance between the objects rand s. An example can 
make things clearer. 
Example 3.5 
Reconsider the lower triangular distance matrix D of the previous examples. We 
first merge the two most similar items, namely, 2 and 5. We again denote this 
new cluster (2;5). The distances between this cluster and the items 1, 3, and 5 
are: 
d = LiE{2,5} LjE{1} dij = 5.39 = 2 695 
(2;5)1 2 x 1 2·' 
d. = LiE{2,5} LjE{3} dij = 8.12 = 4 06 
(2,5)3 2 x 1 2· , 
d = LiE{2,5} LjE{4} dij = 17.48 = 8 74 
(2;5)4 2 x 1 2· , 
Those new distances allow the computation of a 4 x 4 lower triangular distance 
matrix. 
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(2;5) 1 3 4 
(2;5) 
1 2.695 
D 4x4 = 
3 4.06 3.61 
4 8.74 7.07 5.00 
Again, we repeat this pro cess until an items are in the same cluster. Figure 3.4 
illustrates the clustering pro cess on a dendrogram. The merging process is exactly 
the same as the previous examples. 
N 
FIG. 3.4. Dendrogram for the average linkage example. 
Jobson (1992) proposes to use the average linkage method when the data set 
contains extremes and outliers. He describes this method as less sensitive (more 
robust) to those observations than the single and complete linkage methods. 
3.5.4. Centroid method 
The centroid method is different from the previous three methods. U nlike 
the linkage methods, the centroid method computes the distance between two 
clusters using their centroids (or means). This pro cess is best explained by an 
example. 
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Example 3.6 
Consider the data set of Table 3.5. The three variables Xl, X 2 , X3 are ran-
domly generated from three independent normal distributions with mean 0 and 
variance 1. 
TAB. 3.5. Data set for Example 3.6 
1 Observation 1 Xl 1 X2 1 X3 1 
1 0.19 1.11 0.22 
2 -0.43 -0.28 -1.05 
3 0.91 1.02 -0.29 
4 1.79 0.05 0.48 
5 1.00 1.58 -1.22 
The first step is to compute the distance matrix from the data set. It gives the 
following lower triangular matrix: 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 
2 1.98 
D 5x5 = 3 0.89 2.02 
4 1.94 2.72 1.52 
5 1.72 2.35 1.09 2.42 
Again, we select the two most similar items. Therefore, we merge the items 2 
and 3 to obtain the cluster (2;3). Unlike the linkage methods, we now consider a 
reduced data set as shown on Table 3.6. 
TAB. 3.6. Reduced data set for Example 3.6 
1 Observation 1 XII· X 2 1 X 3 1 
(2;3) 0.24 0.37 -0.67 
1 0.19 1.11 0.22 
4 1.79 0.05 0.48 
5 1.00 1.58 -1.22 
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Using this reduced data set, we obtain the following lower triangular distance 
matrix: 
(2;3) 1 4 5 
(2;3) 
1 1.16 
D4x4 = 
4 1.96 1.94 
5 1.53 1.72 2.42 
We repeat this pro cess until all items are in the same cluster. This pro cess gives 
the dendrogram of Figure 3.5. 
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FIG. 3.5. Dendrogram for the centroid method example. 
3.5.5. Ward's method 
Ward's method is neither a linkage method nor a centroid method. This 
method differs from previous methods because it does not use a dissimilarity 
matrix. Moreover, this well-known method uses the concept of sum of squares, 
not used previously. The first step of the Ward's algorithm is to compute the 
within sum of squares for all possible merges. Then, the two items that result in 
the smallest increase in the within sum of squares are merged. Then, the centroid 
of this new cluster is computed. This process is repeated until aIl observations 
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are in a single cluster. Note that an agglomerative method begins with N clusters 
of only one observation. Therefore, the initial within sum of squares is 0 for aIl 
clusters. Let us give an example. 
Example 3.7 
Consider the initial data set introduced in the previous example on the centroid 
method. First, we compute the within sum of squares associated with all possible 
merges. Since the data set contains five observations, we must compute 10 sums 
of squares. Table 3.7 gives those sums of squares. Note that the incremental 
within sum of squares equals the within sum of squares at the first iteration. 
TAB. 3.7. IncrementaI within sums of squares for Example 3.7 
1 Merge 1 IncrementaI sum of squares 1 
( 1 ; 2 ) 1.9647 
( 1 ; 3 ) 0.3933 
( 1 ; 4 ) 1.8756 
( 1 ; 5 ) 1.4753 
( 2 ; 3 ) 2.0316 
( 2 ; 4 ) 3.6891 
( 2 ; 5 ) 2.7667 
( 3 ; 4 ) 1.1541 
( 3 ; 5 ) 0.5933 
( 4 ; 5 ) 2.9275 
Among all sums of squares, merging the items 1 and 3 gives the smallest increase 
in the within sum of squares (0.3933). Again, we compute aIl possible within sums 
of squares and merge the two items with the smallest increase. This procedure 
is repeated until aIl items are in a single cluster. The dendrogram of Figure 3.6 
illustrates the complete clustering structure. 
3.5.6. Computational issues 
The previous examples use only a small volume of data. The computation of 
a dissimilarity matrix requires large resources when the data set contains thou-
sands of observations and variables. To solve this problem, softwares usually 
compute the distances and sums of squares using the Lance-Williams recursive 
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FIG. 3.6. Dendrogram for the Ward's method example. 
formula (Lance and Williams, 1967): Note that Jambu and Lebeaux (1978) give a 
more general formulation a decade later. The Lance-vVilliams formula is however 
sufficient to generate the five hierarchical methods introduced in this chapter. 
Proposition 3.3. Let d(Ci , Cj) denote the distance between clusters Ci and Cj. 
Let ai, (3, and 'Y denote the parameters specifie to a method. The Lance- Williams 
formula is given by: 
This formula allows the construction of most agglomerative hierarchical clus-
tering techniques by replacing each parameter by an appropriate value. For a 
complete list of them, the reader may refer to Gordon (1987). Table 3.8 shows 
the parameters needed to obtain the five methods introduced in this chapter 
(Everitt, 1980). In this table, ni denote the number of objects in the cluster Ci. 
There are other common agglomerative hierarchical clustering techniques like 
the vVard's method and those obtained by the general Lance-Williams formula. 
However, they will not be introduced in this thesis. The interested reader is 
referred to Everitt (1980) or to any textbooks on multivariate analysis. 
Hierarchical clustering techniques (agglomerative and divisive) are designed 
for the analysis of relatively small data sets because of their high requirements of 
computational resources. In insurance fraud detection, a cluster analysis has ta 
be performed on a large volume of data. Therefore, hierarchical techniques are 
TAB. 3.8. Parameters needed to compute aU five methods from the 
Lance-Williams formula. 
Method (3 
Single Link 1 1 0 -1 
"2 2 ""2 
Complete Link 1 1 0 1 2" 2" 2" 
Average Link ~ --.!!:L 0 0 
ni+nj ni+n · 
Centroid Method ~ --.!!:L -CtiCtj 0 
ni+nj ni+n · 
Ward's Method n~+nj nk+ni -n& 0 
nk+ni+nj nk+ni+nj nk+ni+nj 
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not appropriate for the purpose of the current project. Description of hierarchical 
techniques was nevertheless necessary since it is fundamental in any discussion 
on cluster analysis. 
There are three main advantages from using general hierarchical clustering 
techniques. First, it is a flexible tool about the level of granularity. In other 
words, clustering aUows analysis on a ch os en level of precision represented by the 
stopping criterion. Second, linkage methods provide an easy way to handle dif-
ferent types of proximity measures. Thirdly, it is applicable to any type of data 
and/or variables. In the same clustering process, it is possible to consider both 
continuons and discrete data using appropriate proximity measures. Four short-
comings are however worth noting. Difficult issues arise in choosing the number 
of clusters, that is, sorne effort must be made in determining a stopping crite-
rion. In addition, hierarchical clustering techniques do not allow reassignment 
of elements. Once an object is allocated to a cluster, it is impossible to include 
it in a different cluster. Furthermore, hierarchical clustering algorithms are not 
robust in the sense that they do not handle outliers weIl. Finally, they are not 
appropriate when there is a large volume of data. 
As a solution to sorne of the previous drawbacks, in particular to deal with 
large data sets, many algorithms have been designed. Among them, the algo-
rithms BIRCH (Zhang et al., 1996), CURE (Guha et al., 2001), ROCK (Guha 
et al., 2000), and Chameleon (Karypis et al., 1999) are widely used. Due to length 
restrictions, those algorithms are not covered here. 
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3.6. NONHIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING TECHNIQUES 
This section covers the second main type of clustering techniques. They are 
called nonhierarchical clustering techniques They are also called partitioning or 
optimization clustering techniques. The idea behind these techniques is the divi-
sion of a data set into several subsets. 
All nonhierarchical clustering techniques share at least four properties. First, 
nonhierarchical clustering techniques are appropriate for clustering observations 
and not variables (Timm, 2002). Second, they may work with a fixed number k 
of clusters or may allow k to be determined during the clustering pro cess (Ander-
berg, 1973). Third, nonhierarchical methods do not require the computation of a 
dissimilarity matrix making it possible to deal with a larger volume of data than 
hierarchical clustering techniques. In fact, the clustering is performed directly 
on the data matrix Y nxp. Finally, nonhierarchical clustering techniques allow 
the reassignment to a new cluster of an observation previously included into a 
different cluster. 
Nonhierarchical clustering techniques typically follow a five-step process (Timm, 
2002). 
(1) Selection of the initial k seed points or an initial partition of items in k 
groups. 
(2) Assignment of each observation to the nearest seed point. 
(3) Computation of the centroid of the cluster where the observation is added. 
(4) Reassignment of each observation to one of the k clusters. 
(5) Return to step 2 if there is no possible reassignment or a convergence 
criterion is attained. 
There is an impressive number of variants of this process. For example, some 
authors prefer to compute the centroids of the clusters after the assignment of 
each observation to a cluster. 
This section has the following structure. First, it introduces the k-means 
algorithm. Then, it gives possible alternatives to the original method as proposed 
by MacQueen (1967) and an example to show how this method may be applied 
to a data set. 
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3.6.1. k-Means algorithm 
The most common nonhierarchical clustering technique is called k-means algo-
rithm (MacQueen, 1967). However, this is more a generic name for a wide range 
of algorithms than the name of a unique method. Moreover, different statistical 
softwares more than likely use different k-means algorithms. One must therefore 
give great care to this issue before using any statistical software for a cluster anal-
ysis. This section introduces a modified instance of the original algorithm. On 
one hand, MacQueen (1967) proposes to calculate the centroids of a cluster each 
time an observation is added to it. On the other hand, the algorithm used in this 
Master's thesis computes the centroids once aIl assignments are made. Moreover, 
MacQueen (1967) proposes a single pass through the data set. In other words, 
the original algorithm exclu des the fifth step of the process. Before giving an ex-
ample, this section discusses one possible way to adapt the original method, that 
is, through the selection of the initial seeds. Note that the Euclidean distance is 
used in this section. 
MacQueen (1967) proposes to select the first k observations of the data set to 
be the seeds. There are however many possible alternatives (Anderberg, 1973). 
The choice of the initial seeds is known to give very different results. A second 
approach is to randomly select k complete observations to be the initial seeds. A 
third approach is to select the first observation of the data set to be the initial 
seed. Then, one selects the second seed based on its distance with the first 
seed. If the distance between them is greater than a specified radius, then the 
former observation is now the second seed. The distances between the following 
observation and the previous two seeds are then computed. If both distances 
are greater than the radius, th en this observation is the third seed. Other seeds 
are selected the same way. This pro cess is repeated until the specified k seeds 
are chosen. It is also possible to perform seed replacement based on tests like 
hypotheses testing. 
To make things clear, let us summarize the steps of our modified k-means 
algorithm. First, we select k data points to be the initial seeds. The last chapter 
compares the three ways to select the initial seeds with a data set. We then assign 
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each observation to the closest seed based on the Euclidean distance. The new 
centroids are computed once all observations are assigned to a seed. Then, those 
centroids become themselves seeds for the next iteration of the algorithm. The 
algorithm is repeated until a convergence criterion is satisfied. The more common 
criterion is to compare the distances between each observation and its centroid 
to a fixed value of the within sum of squares (Timm, 2002). If the distances 
are aIl smaller than the fixed value, then we assume that convergence is reached. 
Anderberg (1973) gives main steps to prove that this k-means algorithm satisfies 
a convergence property. Fortunately, SAS®CLUSTER procedure has the ability 
to compute aIl previous variants of the k-means algorithm. An example of the 
application of this algorithm is introduced. 
Example 3.8 
Consider the data of Example 3.6. We assume k = 2 and that the observations 1 
and 3 are the initial seeds for clusters Rand 5, respectively. Then, we compute 
the distances between aIl remaining observations and the two centroids. Table 
3.9 gives those distances where dij is the difference between the observation i and 
the seed j. 
TAB. 3.9. Distances for Example .3.8 
1 Observation 1 d iR 1 diS 1 
2 3.93 4.06 
4 3.75 2.31 
5 2.95 1.19 
Next, we look for the smallest distances to assign the observations to either cluster 
R or 5. Therefore, the observation 2 is assigned to cluster R while the observations 
4 and 5 are assigned to cluster 5. vVe then compute the centroids for both clusters. 
Table 3.10 gives those new centroids. 
To see if this reassignment occurs, distances have to be computed again. The 
pro cess continues until there are no possible reassignments. 
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TAB. 3.10. New centroids for Example 3.8 
1 Cluster 1 Xl 1 X 2 1 X 3 1 
1 R 1-0.12 1 0.42 1-0.421 S l.23 0.88 -0.34 
This section introduced the reader to nonhierarchical clustering techniques. 
It discussed the common k-rneans algorithm and potential alternatives. For in-
stance, one may use different methods to select the initial seeds. One rnay also 
change when the reallocation is made in the process. 
3.7. CHOOSING THE NUMBER k OF CLUSTERS 
One of the most important issues in both hierarchical and nonhierarchical clus-
tering techniques is the choice of the number k of clusters. This section introduces 
sorne methods to determine it. As expressed by Everitt (1980), it is important to 
note' that no completely satisfactory solution is available. This review is restricted 
to common criteria generated by the SAS®CLUSTER procedure. 
A first criterion is defined by the following expression: 
R2 _ SST - L:k SSWk 
k - SST ' 
where k is the number of clusters, SST is the total sum of squares, and SSWk is 
the within sum of squares for cluster Ck. This criterion is sirnilar to the coefficient 
of deterrnination found in regression analysis. For this reason, it is also denoted 
R%. Broadly, this criterion indicates the proportion of variance explained by the 
difference between the clusters. A high value of R% suggests better clusters than a 
low value. Sorne authors propose to choose the clusters that explain at least 70% 
of the total variance (SAS Institute Inc., 2004). Other authors propose to observe 
if there is a large decrease in R%. The reader should note the similarity between 
this last rule of thumb and the seree plot rnethod presented in the section on 
principal component analysis. A similar criterion is to take the expected value of 
the previous criterion under the null hypothesis of a single uniform cluster (SAS 
Institute Inc., 2004). Again, sorne authors propose the 70% rule of thumb and 
the seree plot method. 
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Another approach to determine k uses hypotheses testing. The principle is ex-
actly the same as any t-test used to compare the means of two samples. However, 
it now compares the difference of two centroids to a critical value. Unlike the 
previous criteria, those methods need sorne assumptions, that is, the n p-vectors 
are assumed independent and normally distributed. When a data set does not 
satisfy the two assumptions, we calI them pseudo tests. 
A third criterion is given by the following statistic: 
d 2 _ [SSWT - (SSWR + SSWs)](nR + ns - 2) pseu 0 t - SSWR + SSWs ' 
where SSWT is the within sum of squares of the new cluster CT, SSWR is the 
within sum of squares of cluster CR, and nR is the number of observations in 
cluster CR' One then compares this value to a Fisher distribution with p and 
p(nR + ns - 2) degrees of freedom (SAS Institute Inc., 2004). However, it is 
widely accepted that performing many t-tests to compare more than two means 
is inappropriate unless the a level is adjusted. One usually prefers to use the 
principles of the analysis of variable and the associated F-test. Therefore, a 
fourth criterion is given by the expression: 
(SST - L~=l SSWz)/(k - 1) 
pseudo Fk = (L~=l SSWl)/(n - k) , 
where k is the number of clusters, n is the total number of observations, SST is 
the total sum of squares, and SSWl is the within sum of squares for cluster Ck . 
This observed value is then compared to a Fisher distribution with p(k - 1) and 
p(n - k) degrees of freedom (SAS Institute Inc., 2004). 
We introduced in this section four criteria to choose a number of clusters. More 
precisely, we discussed the R% criterion along with its expectation value. We also 
discussed the common t-test and F-test statistics as alternatives to them. We 
finally explained why they are called pseudo criteria. 
3.8. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS AND CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
The current project involves a large number of variables. It would surely be 
a good idea to reduce this number of variables before applying any clustering 
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analysis. The principal component analysis is selected for this purpose. There 
are however two issues to care about when using a principal component analysis 
before a cluster analysis, that is, scaling and weighting. 
First, Jobson (1992) indicates that a correlation matrix is usually more ap-
propriate than a covariance matrix to a principal component analysis because of 
the scaling problem. It was also argued in a previous section that standardization 
needs to be performed prior to any cluster analysis when there are various scales 
of measurements. We gave an example between U.S. dollars and Yen. It would 
be redundant to do the same standardization twice. Jobson (1992) proposes to 
use the correlation matrix along with principal component analysis before any 
cluster analysis in most situations. However, if the proximity measure is of a 
correlation type, then the covariance matrix should be used instead, which also 
prevents redundancy. 
Furthermore, sorne variables may be highly correlated. This is a problem for a 
cluster analysis because a dimension (or a factor) may be given too much impor-
tance. The use of a principal component analysis helps to reduce the dimension 
of a data set while preserving important information. However, as Jobson (1992) 
points out, using principal component analysis prior to a cluster analysis makes 
outliers less detectable by a cluster analysis. Therefore, special care has to be 
given to outliers when using both techniques. 
Most clustering techniques require the computation of a proximity matrix 
which can be either a similarity or a dissimilarity matrix. To obtain such a 
matrix, one needs to select a measure to quantify the distance between two ob-
jects. Among those discussed in this chapter, the Euclidean and the Manhattan 
distances are commonly found in the literature. Each has its own advantages 
and disadvantages. There are two main types of clustering techniques. Hierar-
chical techniques were first introduced with an emphasis on five agglomerative 
techniques. Then, nonhierarchical techniques were introduced whlle a particular 
emphasis was given to the k-means algorithm. Two important issues were then 
discussed at the end of the chapter, that is, the determination of the number 
of clusters and the relation between principal component analysis and cluster 
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analysis. By now, aIl theoretical notions have been described. The next chapter 
provides thè reader with the analysis of the TDMMG fraud data. 
Chapter 4 
STATISTICAL RESULTS 
This chapter presents, the results obtained using the various methods discussed 
previously. It first introduces the data set and sorne other basic issues. It then, 
discusses the reduction of the data set through a principal component analysis. 
The PRIDIT results are also described at that point. The chapter next introduces 
the dustering techniques results. Both agglomerative hierarchical and k-means 
techniques are extensively discussed. It ends with the presentation of sorne rec-
ommendations for subsequent analyses. 
4.1. DATA 
The data set contains 38,043 observations on 63 variables. Each observation 
represents a daim received by TD Meloche Monnex Group (hereafter named 
TDMMG) between June lst, 2006 and May 10th, 2007. The data set therefore 
spans approximately a one-year period. More than one observation can identify 
the same daim. For instance, a daim with both corporal and material damages 
is entered in two observations. One observation represents the corporal damage 
part of the daim while the other represents the mate rial damage part of the daim. 
The reader is also aware that one policy usuaIly insures more than one driver. For 
example, a policy can insure aIl members of a family or both members of a couple. 
In those cases, we consider the driver appearing first on the policy contract as the 
main policyholder. AlI daims are dosed by the time of the extraction. AlI data 
are extracted from the three information systems (AS-400, datawarehouse, and 
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datastagging). Note that TDMMG do es not use the usual meaning of the word 
datawarehouse (Berry and Linoff, 2004). We use SAS@8.02 for most analyses. 
An important step in the data mining pro cess is the selection of the variables 
as introduced in the first chapter. The original data set contains more than sixt Y 
variables. Many variables are however irrelevant to data mining. The identifi-
cation key variables are not useful in any data mining task. Furthermore, sorne 
variables in the data set. are redundant because they give the same information 
as other variables. AlI those variables are therefore exduded from the analyses. 
Sorne variables have values entered in a free format text. Due to time restriction, 
those variables are exduded from the analyses. Sorne variables are exduded from 
analyses because they are not valid or are sim ply irrelevant to the detection of 
fraud. Other variables are also exduded because they require time-consuming 
transformations. According to the literature and to a daim adjuster, the model 
of the vehide is relevant to the detection of fraud (Brockett et al., 2002). A code 
uniquely identifies each model in the data set. The large number of arbitrary 
codes makes however impossible the consideration of this variable in the project. 
The affinity group of a policyholder is àlso potentially relevant to the detection 
of fraud. The situation is similar to the previous variable with more than two 
thousands different unordered codes. 
The selection of variables reduces the data set from more than sixt Y variables 
to eighteen variables. Those selected variables may be grouped in four categories. 
First, the daim variables give information on the daim. The loss variables give 
information on the loss incurred by the policyholder. The policyholder variables 
give information on the main policyholder and its interaction with TDMMG. 
FinalIy, the vehide variables give information on the vehide associated with the 
daim. Table 4.1 lists the selected variables along with their definition. A sharp 
sign indicates a binary variable. 
A major advantage of this project over other similar academic projects is the 
availability of a daim adjuster throughout the project. His expertise provides 
dues to obtain better results. He identifies nine risk factors to car insurance 
fraud. According to his knowledge, a daim is more likely to be fraudulent when: 
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TAB. 4.l. Description of the selected variables 
1 Name 1 Description 
1 Claim variables 
Expenses Indicates the expenses incurred by TDMMG to 
manage the daim. 
Indemnity Indicates the indemnity given to the policy-holder. 
Indicates the number of days between the first 
Opening time and the last financial transaction associated with 
the daim. 
Inforee policy Indicates the number of days between the effec-tive date of the policy and the date of the loss. 
Time interval before report Indicates the number of days between the date 
of the loss and the date of the daim. 
Recovery Indicates the amount recovered by TDMMG. 
1 Loss varIables 
Catastrophe (#) Indicates if the loss occurred at the time of a 
catastrophe. 
Policyholder's liability Indicates the policyholder's liability (in %). The possible values are 0, 25, 50, 75, and 100%. 
Indicates the season wh en the loss occurred. The 
Season of the loss possible values are spring, summer, winter, and 
autumn. 
Time of the loss (#) Indicates if the loss occurred during either the 
night or the day . 
. 
1 Pohcyholder varIables 
Claim free Indicates the number of consecutive years with-
out any daim from the main policyholder. 
Client since Indicates the number of consecutive months the 
main policyholder is insured by TDMMG. 
Policyholder's age Indicates the main policyholder's age. 
Policyholder's gender (#) Indicates the main policyholder's gender. 
Indicates the socio-economic level of the main 
policyholder's residenee. The possible values 
Policyholder's residenee range between 100 and 900. A value of 100 in di-
cates a vicinity with a high socio-economic level. 
A value of 900 indicates a vicinity with a low 
socio-economic level. 
. 
1 Vehlcle varIables 
Age of the vehide Indicates the age of the vehide. 
Ownership (#) Indicates if the vehide is either rented or bought. 
Price of the vehide Indicates the priee of the vehide. 
(1) the associated loss occurs at night, 
(2) the associated loss occurs at the time of a catastrophic event, 
(3) the car is rented (in opposition to bought), 
(4) the policyholder's last daim was filed lately, 
(5) the associated loss occurs in the autumn, 
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(6) there is a large number of days between the date of the loss and the date 
it is reported to TDMMG, 
(7) the daim file is opened for a long time, 
(8) the daimant is a recently insured policyholder, 
(9) the car is expensive. 
This a priori information helps to interpret the results of the duster analyses 
and to identify potential fraudulent daims. That information is however based 
on his intuition and not on scientific facts. Therefore, we cannot blindly rely 
on that expertise. A good approach is to use this useful knowledge along with 
statistical methods. A challenge of this project would be to combine both sources 
of information. 
4.2. COVERAGES 
From Chapter 1, it is dear that the type of coverage has to be used as the 
grouping variable, that is, we have to divide the data set in smaller data sets based 
on that variable. In fact, there is great evidence that risk factors are different 
across coverages. For example, it is inappropriate to indude collision daims and 
third-party liability daims ln the same analysis because intuitively the risk factors 
are different. Table 4.2 presents the distribution of the daims by type of coverage. 
The reader is referred to the first chapter for a compl~te description of coverages 
offered to Ontarian policyholders. 
TAU. 4.2. Distribution of the daims by type of coverage 
1 Coverage 1 Frequency 1 Percent 1 
Collision 16,153 42.46 
TPL - Property damage 13,593 35.73 
Comprehensive 4,897 12.87 
Other 3,399 8.94 
1 Total 38,042 100.00 
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Table 4.2 indicates three major types of daims. Collision daims are the 
most frequent type with 16,153 daims (42%). Third-party liability for property 
damages are the second most frequent type of daim. The data set contains 13,593 
(38%) daims of this type. With 4,897 daims (13%), comprehensive coverages are 
the third type of daim in importance. The Other category contains the four 
remaining types of daims, that is, third-party liability for corporal damages, 
medical and disability coverages, and direct compensation. The reader is referred 
to Chapter 1 for a description of those coverages. We analyzed aIl types of daim 
but only collision daims are presented in this thesis. Collision daims also have 
the highest average severity. The average indemnity for a collision daim is $3,938 
while the average indemnity for aIl other daims is $3,568. The selection of this 
type of coverage is therefore justified. 
Table 4.3 presents main descriptive statistics for the collision daims (mean, 
standard deviation, first and third quartiles). From now on, we assume that those 
variables are continuous. Note that this table exdudes the four binary variables 
and the Season of the loss variable. A good approach to understand the data is to 
compare the mean on a variable with its standard deviation. On one hand, sorne 
variables have a standard deviation smaller than its mean. For instance, a vehide 
is, in average, 5.73 years old with a standard deviation of 3.57 years old. On the 
other hand, sorne variables have a standard deviation much larger than its mean. 
For example, the standard deviation of the time interval before report variable 
is more than three times larger than its mean. On other variables, the standard 
deviation may be similar to the mean. The important point here is to note the 
large differences between the standard deviations of the various variables. This 
observation willlater be important when discussing standardization. Tables 4.4, 
4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 give the distribution of collisions daims based on the five 
discrete variables. 
4.3. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
A principal component analysis (PCA) sometimes helps to reduce the number 
of variables in a data set. The second chapter covered the theory of this data 
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TAB. 4.3. Descriptive statistics for the 16,153 collision daims 
1 Variable 1 Mean 1 St. Dev. 1 QI Q3 
Age of the vehide (years) 5.73 3.57 3 8 
Claim free (years) 2.33 2.65 0 3 
Client since (years) 7.15 6.83 2 10 
Expenses $358 $324 $240 $277 
Indemnity $3,938 $5,019 $882 $5,247 
Opening time (days) 68.86 61.35 25 95 
Policyholder's age (years) 43.47 Il.94 34 51 
Policyholder's liability 39.9% 48.2% 0% 100% 
Policyholder's residence 565 259 344 786 
Price of the vehide $22,956 $14,606 $13,000 $30,700 
Recovery $102 $619 $0 $0 
Inforce policy (days) 175.4 lO5.5 83 266 
Time interval before report 3.93 lO.62 0 3 (days) 
TAB. 4.4. Distribution of the collision daims on Catastrophe variable 
1 Catastrophe 1 Frequency 1 Percent 1 
Not part of a catastrophe 16,136 99.89 
Part of a catastrophe 17 0.11 
1 Total 16,153 100.00 
TAB. -4.5. Distribution of the collision daims on Season of the loss variable 
1 Season of the loss 1 Frequency 1 Percent 1 
Spring 1,507 9.33 
Summer 4,973 30.79 
Autumn 4,909 30.39 
Winter 4,764 29.49 
1 Total 16,153 1 100.00 1 
TAB. 4.6. Distribution of the collision daims on Time of the loss variable 
1 Time of the loss 1 Frequency 1 Percent 1 
15,572 96.40 
581 3.60 
1 Total 16,153 100.00 
reduction technique. Briefly, a principal component is a linear combination of the 
original variables such that its variance is maximized. For sorne business reasons, 
81 
TAB. 4.7. Distribution of the collision claims on Gender variable 
1 Policyholder's gender 1 Frequency 1 Percent 1. 
1 Female 5,712 35.47 
Male 10,390 64.53 
1 Total 16,102 100.00 
TAB. 4.8. Distribution of the collision claims on Ownership variable 
1 Ownership 1 Frequency 1 Percent 1 
Bought car 12,717 1 78.73 
Rented car 3,436 1 21.27 
1 Total 16,153 1 100.00 1 
only nine of the 13 continuous variables and no discrete variables are included in 
the analysis. Table 4.9 lists the nine variables that are included in the PCA. 
TAB. 4.9. List of the variables included in the PCA analysis 
Inforee policy 
Time interval before report 
Policyholder's liability 
Claim free 
Client since 
Policyholder's age 
Policyholder's residence 
Age of the vehicle 
Priee of the vehicle 
The choice of an appropriate input matrix is a major consideration in a PCA. 
The previous section, which provided a description of the variables, indicates that 
there are large differences between the variances of the variables. The correlation 
matrix is therefore an appropriate choiee. We use the SAS@FACTOR procedure 
to perform the analysis. Table 4.10 presents the eigenvalues of the correlation 
matrix. 
An important point in a PCA is the selection of an appropriate number of 
principal components. As exposed in the second chapter, there are many rules of 
thllmb to de termine this number. A ~rst rule of thumb is to select the principal 
components with an eigenvalue larger than 1. This rule suggests the retention of 
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TAB. 4.10. Eigenvalues of the correlation matrix 
1 PC 1 Eigenvalue 1 Proportion 1 Cumulative 1 
1 2.0439 0.2271 0.2271 
2 1.6132 0.1792 0.4063 
3 1.0489 0.1165 0.5229 
4 1.0014 0.1113 0.6342 
5 0.9599 0.1067 0.7408 
6 0.7811 0.0868 0.8276 
7 0.7019 0.0780 0.9056 
8 0.4402 0.0489 0.9545 
9 0.4094 0.0455 1.0000 
four principal components. A second mIe uses a seree plot which is a graph of the 
eigenvalues versus the number of principal components. It is common to select 
the number of principal components that corresponds to an elbow in the plot. 
Figure 4.1 presents the seree plot for the collision daims. This seree plot suggests 
the retention of three principal components because an elbow occurs between the 
second and the third principal components. A third mIe of thumb is to select the 
principal components that explain 70% of variance. This last mIe suggests the 
retention of five principal components. Three mIes give three different solutions. 
The business context however suggests to use no more than two or three principal 
components. The retention of three principal components however explains only 
53% of the total variance. It is therefore inappropriate to use this technique with 
the data given by TDMMG. 
2·'1-~~,,"","";~-~'"----'-------------""""'" 
.,': .. 
Humber of pflncip,ol I:omponellts 
FIG. 4.1. Seree plot of the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix 
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The previous results indicate that a PCA is not useful to reduce the number 
of variables in our data set. While a PCA does not give satisfying results, the 
PRIDIT method actually gives interesting results. They are presented in the 
following section. 
4.4. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS OF RIDIT 
Brockett et al. (2002) propose an innovative unsupervised method to detect 
potential fraudulent daims at the screening level of the daiming process. The 
second chapter provided an overview of this method while the current section 
presents the results. This method requires simple matrix operations. However, 
the Base SAS system does not have such capabilities. The SAS/IML module 
allows such mathematical operations but was not available by the time of this 
project. This section therefore presents results conducted with the open software 
R. 
The second chapter introduced the concept of RIDIT,which is a linear trans-
formation performed on an ordinal variable in order to obtain an interval variable. 
More precisely, a RIDIT maps an ordinal variable into a [-1,1] scale. However, 
our data set mostly contains interval variables. To handle this issue, we discretize 
the interval "ariables into ordinal variables. We choose to discretize all interval 
variables into five-category variables such that all categories are of equallengths. 
This method however results in a 10s8 of information. Nevertheless, it allows us 
to use the RIDIT transformation in order to perform a PRIDIT analysis. 
In Chapter 2, we mentioned that the PRIDIT method requires input variables 
that have categories ranked in a decreasing likelihood of fraud. To have such 
a data set, we use the a priori information given by the daim adjuster. For 
example, the daim adjuster told us that fraudulent daims are more likely to 
occur in autumn but gave no precise information on the other seasons. Hence, 
we give the lowest value to the "Autumn" category. In addition, we group the 
three remaining seasons into a same category and give it the highest value. In 
this section, the Season of the loss variable is therefore binary. Unfortunately, we 
do not have such a priori information for all variables. The daim adjuster gave 
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us information on nine of them. Only those variables may therefore be included 
in a PRIDIT analysis. Table 4.11 gives the RIDIT values for the nine selected 
variables. 
TAB. 4.11. RIDIT values for the nine variables included in the 
PRIDIT analysis 
1 t 1 Variable 
1 Catastrophe -0.9989 0.0011 - - -
2 Season of the loss .,0.6961 0.3039 - - -
3 Time of the loss -0.9640 0.0360 - - -
4 Ownership -0.7873 0.2127 - - -
5 Claim free -0.3603 0.4620 0.7251 0.8558 0.9530 
6 Time interval before report -0.9998 -0.9989 -0.9962 -0.9875 0.0096 
7 Opening time -0.9883 -0.9396 -0.8244 -0.5028 0.3703 
8 Client since -0.2686 0.6338 0.8969 0.9944 0.9999 
9 Priee of the vehicle -0.9998 -0.9976 -0.9737 -0.6587 0.3172 
Using the RIDIT values, the PRIDIT algorithm gives the following vector 
after 10 iterations: 
(10) _ F'S(9) 
W - IIF'S(9)11 
-0.0005 
0.0722 
0.0046 
0.1175 
0.7804 
-0.0029 
0.1899 
0.5705 
-0.1018 
This vector is very interesting. The Claim free and Client since variables both 
have large positive values (0.7804 and 0.5705). Those two variables are therefore 
good indicators of fraud. In other words, a policyholder who have submitted its 
last claim a long time ago is not likely to submit a fraudulent claim. Moreover, a 
loyal policyholder is not likely to submit a fraudulent claim. Those results may 
seem obvious but they give credibility to the PRIDIT method to detect insurance 
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fraud. Other variables are not significant. For obvious reasons, the vector of 
suspicion scores 8(10) is not 'presented here. 
4.5. HIERARCHICAL CLUSTER ANALYSIS ON RELEVANT VARIABLES 
This section presents a comparative study of the various hierarchical clustering 
methods introduced in the third chapter. The large number of claims is however 
a major problem because aIl hierarchical methods require huge computational re-
sources. AIl attempts to perform a single link method on most available resources 
was still running more than two hours after it started. A solution to this problem 
is to select a random sam pie of k claims. This option is appropriate because 
the data set shows no meaningful order of observations. We therefore randomly 
select a sam pie of 100 claims without replacement. The analyses include the nine 
continuous variables. However, they exclude the five discrete variables because 
their inclusion gives pOOl' results. In fact, our analyses show that using various 
types of variables is in efficient in the current context. We apply the transforma-
tion ~~}in{Xlx} on the included variables. The traditional transformation X-JL 
max -rnln a 
gives poor results. We perform the analyses using the SAS®CLUSTER proce-
dure. Note that the analyses use a dissimilarity matrix of Euclidean distances. 
Although the analyses consider only 100 claims, a dendrogram is inappropriate 
due to the still large number of claims. 
There are many criteria to determine the number of clusters in a cluster 
analysis. The third chapter introduced four of them. Table 4.12 reports the 
number of clusters obtained by using those criteria along with the five hierarchical 
methods also introduced in Chapter 3. 
TAB. 4.12. Number of clusters chosen using the four criteria along 
with the five hierarchical methods 
1 Method 1 R2 1 Expected R2 1 F 1 t2 1 
Single link 31 15 14 13 
Complete link 14 15 2 2 
Average link 17 15 3 2 
Centroid 21 15 5 4 
Ward 13 15 2 3 
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The second and third columns report the number of clusters chosen with the 
R2 statistic and the expected R2 statistic, respectively. The common way to use 
those statistics is to select the sm aller number of clusters that explains at least 
70% of the total variance. This rule gives a too large number of clusters for 
both statistics with values that range between 13 and 31. This rule is therefore 
, inappropriate for our data set. The fourth and fifth columns report the number of 
clusters chosen with the pseudo-F statistic and the pseudo-t2 statistic. A general 
rule for those statistics is to select the number of clusters that corresponds to a 
peak in the F and t2 values. This last rule suggests the existence of an average of 
three dusters. The existence of two and four dusters are also good assumptions. 
From now on, we assume the existence of four clusters. Note that this rule is 
inappropriate when using the single link method since this algorithm tends to 
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truncate the tails of the distribution (see Timm (2002)). This is clearly the case 
with results of 13 and 14 clusters. Those results suggest the use of the pseudo-
F statistic and the pseudo-t2 statistic to identify the number of clusters among 
collision daims. It also suggests the use of one of the three last methods (average 
link, centroid, and Ward) for clustering those daims. 
We still have not identified the best method to cluster the collision daims. To 
do so, we compare the solutions given by the clustering algorithms. We exclu de 
the single link algorithm because it gives poor results. Tables 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15 
report the number of claims by duster for the four methods under the assumptions 
of two, three, and four clusters, respectively. 
TAB. 4.13. Number of daims for the four methods un der the as-
sumption of two clusters 
1 Cluster 1 Complete 1 Average 1 Centroid 1 Ward 1 
1 43 98 99 43 
2 57 2 1 57 
The complete link and Ward methods give identical results under the as-
sumption of two dusters. They however provide different results under the other 
TAB. 4.14. Number of daims for the four methods under the as-
sumption of three dusters 
1 Cluster 1 Complete 1 Average 1 Centroid 1 Ward 1 
1 20 43 98 43 
2 57 55 1 45 
3 23 2 1 12 
TAB. 4.15. Number of daims for the four methods under the as-
sumption of four dusters 
1 Cluster 1 Complete 1 Average 1 Centroid 1 Ward 1 
1 20 41 95 18 
2 49 55 3 45 
3 23 2 1 25 
4 8 2 1 12 
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assumptions. Both methods have a high discriminative power because they cre-
ate relatively large dusters. U nlike the previous methods, the average link algo-
rit hm gives conservative results because it discriminates only the two most distant 
daims under the first assumption (two dusters). This method provides conser-
vat ive results under the other assumptions with small dusters having as low as 
two daims. The centroid method also provides conservative results because it 
discriminates only the most different daims. This method discriminates only one 
daim under the assumption of two dusters, two daims under the assumption of 
three dusters and five daims under the last assumptioh. 
No method outperforms the other. The four methods can be ordered on a scale 
based on their discriminative power with the complete link being the most dis-
criminative method and the centroid method being the most conservative method. 
The ideal method depends on the resources allocated to investigate the potential 
fraudulent daims. The centroid method should be used with small resources and 
the Ward's method when large resources are available. This business decision is 
up to TDMMG. 
It is interesting to note the hierarchicai structure of the results. For exam-
pIe, the centroid method gives one duster containing 99 daims and another one 
containing one daim un der the assumption of two dusters. Therefore, this last 
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claim remains into a different cluster under the two other assumptions. In other 
words, when one observation is clustered into a different cluster, it will remains 
clustered whenever a larger number of clusters is assumed. This observation does 
not apply to the Ward's method. 
From now on, we assume the choice of the Ward's method and the existence 
of four clusters. A useful step is to compute descriptive statistics for each cluster. 
They are presented in Table 4.16 for the continuous variables. Tables 4.17, 4.18, 
4.19, and 4.20 presents the frequencies for four out of the five discrete variables. 
The random sample do es not contain any claim part of a catastrophie event. 
Although the discrete variables were excluded from the analyses, it is interesting 
to see their distributions. 
The most distant cluster is thecluster D. It is however not clear that this 
cluster actually contains the fraudulent claims. We can compare the descriptive 
statistics with the risk factors provided by the claim adjuster. The claim adjuster 
identified a high-valued car as a potential risk factor. The average price of the 
vehicles included into cluster D is clearly higher than the average priee in the 
other clusters. The claim adjuster also identified a large number of days between 
the date of the loss and the date it is reported as a risk factor. Cluster D contains 
claims reported in average five days after the loss, which is higher than the time 
interval for the other clusters. The results are unfortunately not all in concordance 
with the a priori information given by the claim adjuster. For instance, the claim 
adjuster identified a recently insured policyholder as a potential risk factor for 
fraud. The claims in the cluster D are submitted by a polieyholder insured for 
an average of 20 years while the other clusters have lower values on this variable. 
The same observation is also valid for the number of years without any claim for 
the policyholder. 
This section introduced the results obtained from the most common hierar-
chieal clustering methods performed on a sample of 100 collision claims. The 
five covered methods were the single, complete, and average link methods, the 
centroid m~thod, and the Ward's method. We first compared four common rules 
to determine thenumber of clusters in the sample. On one hand, the results 
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TAB. 4.16. Average values for the four dusters using the Ward's method 
1 Variable· A B c D 
Age of the vehide 5.11 5.96 7.20 4.42 
Claim free 0.44 1.73 1.96 3.92 
Client since 2.94 5.27 7.52 20.0 
Expenses 371 339 473 432 
Indemnity 6,233 2,924 3,098 1,615 
Opening time 84.2 69.7 67.8 62.5 
Policyholder's age 35.3 41.9 48.9 56.2 
Policyholder's liability 100.0 1.1 100.0 4.2 
Policyholder's residence 820 601 384 364 
Priee of the vehide 19,192 22,795 20,091 38,485 
Recovery 122 0 76 0 
Inforce policy 188 161 142 187 
Time interval before report 2.22 2.78 4.00 5.00 
1 Number of observatIOns 18 45 25 12 
TAB. 4.17. Distribution of the collision daims on Season of the 
loss variable by dusters 
1 Season of the loss 1 A 1 Ble 1 D 1 Total 1 
Spring 3 3 3 1 10 
Summer 4 15 4 1 24 
Autumn 6 17 9 4 36 
Winter 5 10 9 6 30 
1 Total 118 1 45 1 25 112 1 100 1 
TAB. 4.18. Distribution of the collision daims on Time of the loss 
variable by dusters 
1 Time of the loss 1 A 1 Ble 1 D 1 Total 1 
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6 
1 Total 118 1 45 1 25 112 1 100 
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suggest the existence of two, three or four dusters. On the other hand, they sug-
gest the use of a specifie method based on the available resources at TDMMG. If 
we assume that the most distant duster contains the fraudulent daims and the 
existence of four dusters, about 12 daims are potentially fraudulent. However, 
the results do not dearly indicate that those daims are fraudulent. Nevertheless, 
a particular attention has to be given to those cIaims. 
TAB. 4.19. Distribution of the collision daims on Gender variable 
by clusters 
1 Policyholder's gender 1 A 1 Ble 1 D 1 Total 1 
1 Female 
Male 
44 
55 
1 Total 118 1 44 1 25 112 1 99 
TAB. 4.20. Distribution of the collision claims on Ownership vari-
able by clusters 
Bought car 
Rented car 
1 Total 
4.6. NONHIERARCHICAL CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
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The second main type of clustering methods is the nonhierarchical cluster 
analysis. Unlike hierarchical cluster analysis, those methods require a known 
number of clusters. In addition, they require less computational resources and 
reallocation of objects is now possible. The reader is referred to the previous 
chapter of this thesis for a discussion on the popular k-means algorithms. Both 
SAS@Enterprise Miner™(EM) and SAS@FASTCLUS procedure were used to 
generate nonhierarchical clusters. Since EM uses the FASTCLUS procedure to 
generate results, we have expected the same results with both softwares. Surpris-
ingly, this is not the case. By the time of the project, documentation of what 
EM is actually doing was inaccessible and largely incomplete. In this section, 
we therefore briefiy introduce EM. We prefer to emphasize on the FASTCLUS 
procedure. 
EM is a software desigried to perform most data mining tasks. The reader is 
referred to the first chapter for a discussion on data mining. While the FAST-
CLUS procedure may perform most nonhierarchical cluster analyses, the CLUS-
TER node of EM provides additional capabilities. One interesting addition to 
the basic procedure is the option of selecting the initial seeds using the principal 
components. In addition, the CLUSTER node may automatically determine the 
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number of dusters. EM also gives the relative importance of the variables entered 
in CLUSTER node. However, the official documentation of EM gives no dues on 
this ambiguous concept of relative importance. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, an important issue to consider with k-means 
algorithm is the selection of the initial seeds. A good approach is to compare 
results obtained from different methods of selecting those seeds. We compare 
the three methods introduced the previous chapter. We however do not consider 
seed replacement in this thesis. Table 4.21 gives the number of daims for each 
duster with the first two methods and the third method with different radius, 
that is, 0.75, 1, and 1.25. The table shows very different results. The best we 
can say in this project is that there is no meaningful order of observations in 
the data set. This makes therefore aU methods acceptable. We consider the 
simple random sampling method to be consistent with the previous section on 
hierarchical duster analysis where a sample of 100 daims was selected. Using 
the results on the hierarchical methods and the results obtained with EM, we 
assume the existence of four dusters. We standardize the values with the min-
max normalization. As the previous duster analyses, we exdude the five discrete 
variables. 
TAB. 4.21. Number of daims for the four dusters using three meth-
ods of selecting the initial seeds 
1 Methods A B c D 
First k complete daims 6,255 3,392 3,279 3,227 
Random sampling 2,967 3,473 5,123 4,590 
Radius (0.75) 3,035 4,581 5,000 3,537 
Radius (1) 6,255 3,615 4,614 1,669 
Radius (1.25) 3,473 5,124 4,589 2,967 
Table 4.22 gives the average values for the 13 continuous variables. It is 
interesting to compare this table with Table 4.16. We can see that the vVard's 
method and the k-means algorithm give largely different results. Those differences 
tell us that we actually need more information of a daim adjuster in order to 
darify the characteristics of a fraudulent daim. The effectiveness of any statistical 
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method depends on the quality of its interpretation. Unfortunately, we do not 
have sufficient information for an adequate interpretation. For Tables 4.23, 4.24, 
4.25, 4.26, and 4.27 give the distribution of the five dis crete variables by clusters. 
TAB. 4.22. Average values for the four clusters using the k-means algorithm 
1 Variable A B c D 
Age of the vehicle 6.00 5.90 5.61 5.55 
Claim free 2.35 2.38 1.49 3.23 
Client sinee 7.97 6.43 4.62 9.99 
Expenses 387 370 341 347 
Indemnity 4,715 4,619 3,457 3,458 
Opening time 70.8 70.7 68.7 66.3 
Policyholder's age 44.4 43.3 39.2 47.8 
Policyholder's liability 97.9 98.4 1.3 1.2 
Policyholder's residenee 548 579 773 338 
Price of the vehicle 22,388 21,967 21,048 26,201 
Recovery 147 144 59 87 
Inforce policy 275 88 178 175 
Time interval before report 4.15 4.68 3.29 3.93 
TAB. 4.23. Distribution of the collision claims on Catastrophe vari-
able by clusters 
1 Catastrophe 
TAB. 4.24. Distribution of the collision claims on Season of the 
loss variable by clusters 
1 Season of the loss 1 A B C D 1 Total 1 
Spring 301 279 486 441 1,507 
Summer 884 1,011 1,658 1,420 4,973 
Autumn 846 1,054 1,615 1,394 4,909 
Winter 936 1,129 1,364 1,335 4,764 
1 Total 1 2,967 1 3,473 1 5,123 1 4,590 1 16,153 1 
TAB. 4.25. Distribution of the collision claims on Time of the loss 
variable by clusters 
TAB. 4.26. Distribution of the collision claims on Gender variable 
by clusters 
A B c 
Female 
Male 
1 Total 
TAB. 4.27. Distribution of the collision claims on Ownership vari-
able by clusters 
A B c D 
1 Total 
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Cluster D is the most distant cluster using the Euclidean distance. However, 
there is no clear evidence that the claims belonging to the cluster D are actually 
fraudulent. For instance; claims of the cluster D are submitted by policyholders 
insured for an average of 10 years by TDMMG. Nevertheless, those results give 
an implicit segmentation of collision claims. Therefore, we expect them to be 
useful in sorne following statistical analyses. For example, it will be possible to 
select better samples for more precise statistical analyses of insurance fraud. 
4.7. NEXT STEPS ... 
In this project, we considered two broad categories of methods to obtain new 
knowledge on insurance fraud, that is,· methods based on the PCA and those 
based on the concept of cluster. The traditional PCA does not help to reduce the 
number of variables of the ~ata set provided by TDMMG. The PRIDIT method 
is however promising. Since the objective of this thesis was to explore and to 
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describe various methods to detect in surance fraud, a small portion of it was 
voluntarily devoted to the PRIDIT method. Our analysis show that the two 
variables Claim free and Client since are good indicators of a fraudulent claim. 
Further analyses should be performed on more potentially important indicators. 
The assumption that the most distant cluster contains the fraudulent claims 
is maybe too restrictive. Since we had no information on previous fraudulent 
claims, unsupervised methods were the only possible methods to use and they re-
quire this assumption. TDMMG should therefore take the problem from another 
perspective. An interesting approach is to consider supervised methods instead 
of unsupervised methods. For example, TDMMG might select a sample of recent 
claims, depending on their resources, in order to create a data set that contains 
this variable. Logistic regression seems particularly interesting. 
This thesis covered four methods to detect fraudulent claims and most of the 
results were presented in this chapter. Main PCA results were first introduced. 
We find PCA not efficient to reduce the data set. In fact, it seems afterward 
that PCA is not an appropriate method when mining data. This conclusion is 
drawn from our experience with many of the TDMMG data sets. Second, we 
discussed the innovative PRIDIT method as proposed by Brockett et al. (2002). 
This method seems to be the best one to detect insurance fraud. The chapter 
then covered agglomerative hierarchical clustering results. More precisely, we 
studied the usefulness of those techniques to detect fraudulent claims. Those 
methods require large computational resources and may therefore prevent TD-
MMG from using them. Fortunately, some algorithms are developed to deal with 
this problem. The BIRCH and the CURE algorithms are two algorithms that use 
the ideas of the hierarchical methods but that reduce the required computational 
time. TDMMG should consider using those algorithms. This chapter ended with 
the k-means algorithm and its corresponding results. We however do not have the 
actual expertise to assess the potential value of those clusters. TDMMG should 
consult different daim adjusters and other daim staff members for interpretation. 
CONCLUSION 
Let us recall what we have seen in this Master's thesis. The first chapter in-
troduced the reader to the main issues of insurance fraud. We also discussed 
the car insurance regime in Ontario. We conduded this first chapter with an 
overview of data mining. The presentation of statistical concepts began with the 
second chapter. We first described the types of data framework used in this Mas-
ter's thesis. We next introduced the concept of RIDIT, which is simply a linear 
transformation of ordinal variables. Before introducing the innovative PRIDIT 
method, we discussed principal component analysis in order to understand this 
method. The third chapter covered the vast field of clustering techniques. This 
chapter began with an explanation of how to measure the proximity between two 
objects. We then considered two major types of clustering techniques. On one 
hand, we explained main hierarchical clustering techniques. On the other hand, 
we discussed non-hierarchical clustering techniques. We concluded our chapter 
on cluster analysis with a discussion on the choice of an appropriate number of 
clusters. The last chapter presented the data set given by Meloche Monnex and 
the results obtained when performing the methods introduced in the second and 
third chapters. 
The main idea of this project was simple. Given a large data set of car 
insurance claims, is it possible to identify the fraudulent claims? However, we were 
facing an important problem since we had no information on previous fraudulent 
claims. We therefore choose an unsupervised method; which restrict largely the 
range of appropriate methods. Given a data set of claims, we first performed a 
principal component analysis to reduce the dimensionality of our data set. We 
then performed a PRIDIT analysis to identify the suspicious daims and the most 
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relevant variables. Vve finally used various clustering techniques to create clusters 
of fraudulent claims. 
This thesis provides quantitative results obtained by various statistical meth-
ods. At first glance, the PRIDIT method seems to be a good option to detect 
fraudulent claims while the various clusters seem irrelevant to insurance fraud. It 
is maybe true but it may also be false. We tried to give to them the best interpre-
tation we could. However, an in-depth interpretation of the results and clusters 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. In fact, we do not have the experience to do 
this. A claim adjuster should interpret the results. We frequently mentioned that 
in this thesis, but we feel it is not a sufficient but a necessary option to consider. . 
The main point is that any statistical method depends on the data set and 
there are unfortunately no magical algorithms. AlI statistical methods covered in 
this thesis showed to be efficient on examples and literature gives many examples 
of appropriate applications. By now, there is therefore no reason to discard those 
methods for subsequent analyses. 
From now on, there are two options to get better results. They are not mutu-
ally exclusive but complementary to each other. The best is therefore to perform 
both options. First, TDMMG may continue with the unsupervised methods in-
troduced in this thesis. The in-depth interpretation is necessary to precise the 
direction to take. Second, TDMMG may consider using a supervised method 
on a sample of claims already investigated. A logistic regression seems to be 
particularly interesting to us. 
FinalIy, we would like to point out that this project has been completed during 
a major restructuring of the activities of TDMMG. In other words, the priority 
given to this project has dramatically decreased near the end of the project. It 
largely explains why a reader may find that the results are incomplete. Never-
theless, the results have, in practice, a great business value to TDMMG. 
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APPENDIX 
# By: Mathieu Poissant 
# Date: August 12th, 2008 
# This program computes the PRIDIT a~gorithm. 
# The data set is entered here. 
# V1 c(1,1,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1/ 
# V2 = c(1,2,2,0,0,1,1,2,1,0J-
# V3 = c(3,3,3,1,2,3,0,3,1,2) 
# Data = cbind (V1, V2, V3) 
# Use this part if the data set is a de~imited fi~e. 
Data read.table(IPRIDIT.data", header=T) 
Data as.data.frame(Data) 
attach (Data) 
# Sets the number of iterations of the PRIDIT a~gorithm. 
nb.iterations = 10 
# Determine the number of categories for each variab~e. 
k = matrix(, nrow = ncol(Data), ncol = 1) 
foret in l:ncol(Data)) 
{ 
k[t] = length(unique(Data[,t])) 
} 
# Compute the RIDIT value for each category. 
B matrix (, nrow = max (k [t]), ncol = ncol (Data)) 
for (t in l:ncol(Data)) 
{ 
} 
for (i in O:k[t]-1) 
{ 
} 
B[i+l,t] = sum(Data[,t]<i)/length(Data[,t])-sum(Data 
[,t]>i)/length(Data[,t]) 
# Compute the F matrix. 
F = matrix(, nrow = nrow(Data), ncol ncol (Data)) 
for (t in l:ncol(Data)) 
{ 
} 
for Ci in 1:nrow(Data)) 
{ 
} 
Value = Data[i,t] 
F[i,t] = B[Value+1,t] 
# The PRIDIT algorithm. 
S matrix(,nrow = nrow(Data), ncol = 1) 
W matrix(1, nrow = ncol(Data), ncol = 1) 
S F %*% W # SO 
for (j in (1:nb.iterations)) 
{ 
} 
W (t(F)%*%S) / sqrt(sum«t(F)%*%S)-2)) 
S F %*% W 
detach(Data) 
li 
